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GENERAL DAMAGES ARE INCOHERENT,
INCALCULABLE, INCOMMENSURABLE, AND
INEGALITARIAN (BUT OTHERWISE
A GREAT IDEA)
Richard Abel
Lawyers care deeply about damages. Before taking cases, plaintiffs'
lawyers are as concerned about what they are worth as about the diffi-
culty of proving liability.1 Defendants and insurers want to know
what to offer in settlement or invest in defense. But law professors
marginalize damages.2 In the two years between December 2002 and
December 2004, just 111 of the 1,100 scholarly articles on torts con-
cerned damages (ten percent), of which twenty-one (two percent) dis-
cussed punitive damages (because recent Supreme Court decisions
had constitutionalized the issue) and fifteen (1.4%) discussed medical
malpractice caps (in response to the third wave of liability insurance
"crises"). 3 Treatises and texts give equally short shrift to damages,
generally less than ten percent of their pages, often none at all (see
Table A). 4 If we use casebooks as a surrogate measure of the atten-
tion to damages in the basic torts course, it is equally minimal (see
Table B). 5 No casebook devotes more than ten percent of its pages to
damages and almost all devote significantly less. Furthermore, virtu-
ally all casebooks postpone damages to the end of the first-year
course. The torts catechism every 1L learns-duty, breach, causation,
damages-embeds this ordering. In the overcrowded first-year torts
course (especially during the first semester, when everything is new),
that sequence typically produces a hasty overview of damages, con-
ducted at a moment when students are increasingly anxious about ex-
1. See WHAT'S IT WORTH: A GUIDE TO CURRENT PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS AND SETFLE-
MENTS (James P. Munger ed., 2004).
2. Louis L. Jaffe was a rare exception: "[T]he crucial controversy in personal injury torts today
is not in the area of liability but of damages." Louis L. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The
Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 221 (1953). And so are those who teach
and write about remedies, but these are upper-level courses, typically unrelated to substantive
law. See also A.I. OGUs, THE LAW OF DAMAGES (1973).
3. For the ten year period ending December 2004, 533 of 7805 torts articles discussed damages
(7%), of which eighty-two (1%) concerned punitive damages and fifty-five (0.7%) discussed
damage caps. I am grateful to June Kim of the UCLA Law School Library for these data.
4. See infra app. tNl.A.
5. See infra app. tbl.B.
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ams. If most students are asking themselves what the bolder students
ask me-will this be on the test?-many of us have to admit it will
not.
Marc Franklin and Robert Rabin (whose casebook I have used
since coming to UCLA in 1974) actually began their first edition with
Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines.6 They used it to introduce the
entire torts process, however, devoting only a page to damages. In the
third edition, when they moved Seffert permanently to the end of the
first-year course, they explained their cursory treatment of damages: 7
The reason for not going into greater detail is suggested in Jaffe,
Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 219 (1953). Professor Jaffe asserted that questions
of liability have "great doctrinal fascination" but that damage ques-
tions "and particularly their magnitude-do not lend themselves so
easily to discourse. Professors dismiss them airily as matters of trial
administration." The reason for the different treatment is not so
much a "judgment of relative importance ... as the relative adapta-
bility of the subjects to conceptualization."
But should pedagogic convenience and convention dictate empha-
sis? For most of the last thirty years, I have begun my course with
damages-much to the consternation of students who believe the ta-
ble of contents is handed down from on high and who, by the second
semester, have learned that if it is not black letter it does not count.8
(We are all too familiar with the "pens down" response to "policy"
discussions-or the contemporary equivalent of switching to solitaire
or e-mail.) I start from the back of the book not out of perversity but
because damages are foundational. Students cannot understand
whether and under what circumstances accident victims should have
rights and defendants should have duties without knowing the rem-
edy. This is true regardless of whether tort law is conceived as correc-
tive or distributive justice. For the majority of teachers who believe
efficiency should be at least one criterion for liability, Learned Hand's
famous formula 9 reminds us that negligence is a function of the mag-
nitude of potential injuries. Furthermore, whereas the other two vari-
ables in Hand's formula-the probability of accidents and the cost of
safety precautions-are empirically ascertainable, the "costs of acci-
6. 364 P.2d 337 (Cal. 1961).
7. MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 431 (3d ed. 1983). Harry Kalven, Jr. called damages "jury law." Harry Kalven Jr.,
The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158, 160 (1958).
8. Thomas D. Russell at the Sturm College of Law, University of Denver, and Tom Baker at
University of Connecticut School of Law, also do so.
9. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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dents" (in Calabresi's phrase) 10 are an inescapably political decision
(as Michelman observed when reviewing Calabresi's book)." Reflect-
ing on those costs focuses us on the multiple ways in which history
shapes tort law-not just the effect of technology on the ability of
inadvertent actions to inflict catastrophic harm, but also the multiple
changes that have redefined that harm: the shift from self-sufficient
production to waged work, the concomitant inability of family mem-
bers to provide care (and the increased opportunity costs of doing
so),12 the growing capacity of medicine to repair the harm (at ever
increasing prices), and the corollary sense of entitlement to physical
and mental well-being. The enormous increase in the quantum of
damages, in turn, profoundly influences the need for and contours of
insurance, the centrality of vicarious and enterprise liability, and the
ways in which lawyers' contingent fees structure access to justice. The
need for a deep pocket (and the differences among for-profit, charita-
ble, and governmental; and insured, uninsured, and self-insured de-
fendants), in turn, greatly complicates the capacity of tort law either to
correct wrongs or to reduce danger.
An approach to torts from the perspective of remedies is inescap-
ably critical. Tort law gives victims only money damages; it does not
elicit apologies, 13 provide care,1 4 change risky behavior,' 5 or punish.
The single-judgment rule requires the jury (the usual trier of fact) to
make impossible predictions about future earnings (which can be dra-
matically altered by unforeseeable macroeconomic trends, technologi-
cal change, and cultural transformations like feminism and antiracism)
and medical care (similarly affected by inflation, financing, and scien-
tific advances). We fail to compensate disabled victims for losing the
intrinsic satisfactions of work but also fail to deduct their opportunity
benefits from not working. The victim's death from other causes elim-
inates future loss if it occurs before judgment but not if immediately
after (although structured settlements remedy this anomaly). The
judgment has to be discounted to present value16-another impossi-
10. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970).
11. Frank I. Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's
Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647 (1971).
12. EMILY ABEL, HEARTS OF WISDOM: AMERICAN WOMEN CARING FOR KIN, 1850-1940
(2000).
13. Cf. Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture
in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 461 (1986).
14. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts
Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 853.
15. Injunctions are very rare.
16. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Sutton, 765 So. 2d 1269, 1275 (Miss. 2000).
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ble, decades long prediction of interest rates. We do not tax compen-
satory damages1 7 but do not know what allowance juries make for
taxes. The inevitable errors compensate and deter too much or too
little. We make predictions not because they are unavoidable but be-
cause plaintiffs' lawyers demand their entire fees at judgment and
therefore in a lump sum.
Pecuniary damages reproduce inequality. Medical expenses vary
with income, wealth, health insurance (despite the collateral source
rule), and sophistication in consuming medical care. (Some lawyers
send victims to doctors who will accept a lien on the judgment to guar-
antee payment and pad bills to inflate damages-and hence the con-
tingent fee-without actually providing more or better care.)
Damages for lost wages obviously reproduce income inequality
(which now varies by magnitudes of 500:1 between CEO and worker
in large corporations).' 8 The Mississippi Supreme Court sought ref-
uge from such discomfort through denial: "Who is to say that a child
from the most impoverished part of the state or with extremely poor
parents has less of a future earnings potential than a child from the
wealthiest part of the state or with wealthy parents?"' 19 (Answer:
every sociological study of stratification.)
Both inequalities have further ramifications. First, victims, their
families, and other audiences see the award as an official declaration
of the victim's worth. Consider the anger over the disparities between
the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund awards to corporate
executives and to dishwashers at Windows on the World. Second, both
rich and poor contribute to those unequal payments, through liability
insurance premiums and taxes, in amounts that are not proportioned
to what they will receive as victims. Third, because the "costs of acci-
dents" vary with victim identity, entrepreneurs in a competitive mar-
ket must seek to expose the cheapest victims to injuries, for instance
by locating dangerous activities near poor people's homes. 20 Nine-
teenth-century American industrialization was heavily subsidized by
17. I.R.C. § 104 (West 2005).
18. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1 (2004).
19. Greyhound Lines, 765 So. 2d at 1276-77.
20. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990). Judge
Posner stated: "Brutal though it may seem to say it, the inappropriate use to which land is being
put in the Blue Island yard and neighborhood may be, not the transportation of hazardous
chemicals, but residential living. The analogy is to building your home between the runways at
O'Hare." Id. at 1181. This is presumably not a mistake Richard Posner would make. Cf. CSX
Transp., Inc. v. Palank, 743 So. 2d 556 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (addressing a railroad switch-
yard located next to a poor, black, community).
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uncompensated worker injuries.21 Union Carbide located its plant in
Bhopal for many reasons, but one may have been the realistic expec-
tation of paying much less for accidents than it would have in the
United States. That few Chinese families recover even the low level
of damages legally authorized for the 140,000 workplace deaths in
2002 (up from 109,000 in 2000) is part of the explanation for capital
flight of industry to China. 22 As former chief economist of the World
Bank, Lawrence Summers argued:
[A] given amount of health impairing pollution should be done in
the country with the lowest cost, which will be the country with the
lowest wages. I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of
toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and we should
face up to that.23
(This was not a position he could comfortably maintain as president of
Harvard.) Environmental justice advocates have repeatedly docu-
mented these decisions.24
Nonpecuniary damages raise many of the same problems, often in
aggravated form, and introduce others. I expose students to these
through an appellate court's description of the injuries Joe Dial suf-
fered in a car accident.25 He was thirty-two, married to Arrah,
twenty-nine, father of a one-year-old daughter, and a part-time em-
ployee and doctoral student at the University of Arizona, which ex-
pected to hire him after he completed his Ph.D. in electrical
engineering. His supervisor thought Dial would be number one or
two in the country in the field of medical instrumentation in a few
years. He played tennis, basketball, baseball, and volleyball, had a
daily physical fitness program, rode his bicycle to work, and did a lot
of hiking, backpacking, and camping with his wife. The crash inflicted
severe burns over his entire face, neck and ears, including the inside of
his mouth, tongue and tonsils. After a month of treatment, including
debridement-stripping off dead skin following immersion in a water
21. P. W. J. BARTRIP & S. B. BURMAN, THE WOUNDED SOLDIERS OF INDUSTRY: INDUSTRIAL
COMPENSATION POLICY 1833-97 (1983); CRYSTAL EASTMAN, WORK ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW
(1910); JOHN FABIAN WIr, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE
WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004); CARL GERSUNY, WORK HAZARDS
AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT (1981).
22. Joseph Kahn, China's Workers Risk Limbs in Export Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2003, at
A3 (explaining that an injured Chinese worker received 200,000 yuan-or $24,000-for loss of
all of his fingers).
23. Memorandum from Lawrence Summers (Dec. 12, 1991), available at http://www.
whirledbank.org/ourwords/summers.html.
24. The Whirled Bank Group, Toxic Waste and the World Bank, http://www.whirledbank.org/
environment/waste.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2005).
25. Wry v. Dial, 503 P.2d 979 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (liability uncontested).
2006]
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solution, a procedure so painful that it required sedation by morphine
and still made some patients hate their nurses-Dial began getting
skin grafts. 26 But keloid scars formed at both the donor and recipient
sites, making the procedure problematic. His greatly heightened risk
of skin cancer would keep him indoors for the rest of his life and
might force him to move to the overcast Northwest. He had to aban-
don all recreational activities. He was at higher risk of epilepsy. His
constantly itching skin made sleep difficult. Although he had always
been reserved, brain damage made him "frontal lobish": facetious,
garrulous, and he displayed inappropriate responses and rapid mood
swings. Fearing he was repugnant to everyone, he avoided being seen.
He no longer ate with colleagues. He felt sexually repulsive to his
wife and afraid to hold his daughter. He could no longer concentrate
or remember adequately. He was unable to finish his Ph.D. and had
lost any prospect of a university appointment. I ask the students to
put themselves on the jury and imagine what they would propose for
nonpecuniary damages at the beginning of deliberations. I graph the
results, which always show a dramatic divergence, ranging from little
or nothing to tens of millions of dollars (see Table C).27 In the ensu-
ing discussion among those from opposite ends of the broad spectrum,
I ask what victims want and deserve and explore the problems of com-
pensability, commensurability, commodification, calculability, arbi-
trariness, and equality. Although I discuss these separately below, I
acknowledge their overlap and interaction.
The goals of nonpecuniary damages are ambiguous, incoherent, and
contradictory. 28 Marc Franklin and Robert Rabin begin their treat-
ment of compensatory damages with the conventional wisdom: "The
fundamental goal of damage awards in the unintentional tort area is to
return the plaintiff as closely as possible to his or her condition before
the accident. '29 But, as the Second Restatement of Torts acknowl-
edges, general damages are even less capable of doing this than spe-
cials (which have their own serious problems). 30 Joe Dial plus his
injuries plus a lot of money does not equal the status quo ante. Chief
26. Id. at 983.
27. See infra app. tbl.C.
28. Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993).
29. Cf. Victoria Laundry (Windsor), Ltd., v. Newman Indus., Ltd. [1949] 2 K.B. 528, 539,
quoted in Oous, supra note 2, at 17: "It is well settled that the governing purpose of damages is
to put the party whose rights have been violated in the same position, so far as money can do so,
as if his rights had been observed." See MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW
AND ALTERNATIVES 689 (7th ed. 2001).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1979) (noting that when "tort causes bodily
harm or emotional distress, the law cannot restore the injured person to his previous position").
258 [Vol. 55:253
2006] GENERAL DAMAGES ARE INCOHERENT 259
Judge Wachtler of the New York Court of Appeals (a leading plain-
tiffs' personal injury lawyer before becoming a judge) made a virtue of
necessity: "[A]lithough money damages will neither ease the pain nor
restore the victim's abilities, this device is as close as the law can come
in its effort to right the wrong."'3' This is neither a true-American
tort law rejects many other possible remedies-nor a sufficient re-
sponse to the criticism. It perpetuates the common fallacy that to
someone with a hammer every problem is a nail. Judge Posner, unsur-
prisingly, framed the same conclusion in economic language: "No one
likes pain and suffering and most people would pay a good deal of
money to be free of them."32 But giving victims money does not free
them from pain. Survey respondents report they would pay more ex
ante to avoid pain than they would want to be paid ex post.33 Most
would pay everything they have to avoid Joe Dial's torment.34 Indeed,
willingness to pay inevitably varies with ability to pay. Jaffe claims
that nonpecuniary damages appease the victim's anger, deflect ven-
geance, and restore self-confidence; but he offers no evidence for
these claims, never explains why it is right to do so, and fails to con-
sider whether other responses would better advance these goals.35
II. WHAT Do VICTIMS WANT?
This turns out to be a hard question to answer. Remedies inevitably
shape wants. Automobile accident victims favor general damages, and
their enthusiasm varies directly with injury severity and whether they
have filed suit.36 Victims are much more likely to feel they should get
general damages than that others should.37 David Engel found that
31. McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375 (N.Y. 1989).
32. Kwasny v. United States, 823 F.2d 194, 197 (7th Cir. 1987).
33. Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering
Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995).
34. As another court has said, "We take it as a given that reasonable people of his age, in good
mental and physical health, would not have traded one-quarter of his suffering for a hundred
million dollars, much less twelve." Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., No. 94-7501 (2d
Cir. Aug. 28, 1995) (addressing a claim of imminent cancer death from asbestos exposure).
35. See Jaffe, supra note 2.
36. Seventy-six percent of all 378 respondents thought that when the person at fault has
enough insurance, he should also pay something for the pain and suffering. ALFRED F. CONARD
ET AL., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS 265 (1964). Among serious injury vic-
tims the proportions were seventy-one percent of those who had not filed suit and eighty-eight
percent of those who had; only seventy-one percent of minor injury victims felt tortfeasors
should pay general damages. Id.
37. In a sample of 321 automobile accident victims in New York City in 1957, ninety-one
percent thought compensation should include pain and suffering. ROGER BRYANT HUNTING &
GLORIA S. NEUWIRTH, WHO SUES IN NEW YORK CITY? 41-42, 91 (1962). Forty percent felt they
should get more than expenses compared with twenty-eight percent who felt they should get just
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residents in rural downstate Illinois see tort claimants as "trying to
look for something for nothing. ' 38 A woman who suffered serious
burns and permanent skin damage when a flight attendant spilled hot
coffee on her legs settled for medical expenses and the cost of the lost
vacation rather than claiming tort damages because "we don't do
that."'39 A mother whose seventeen-year-old daughter was killed and
fourteen-year-old daughter injured in a tragic Texas school bus crash
said, "I didn't want a lawyer ... I said, 'The first lawyer who can bring
my daughter back, I'll hire.' But everyone started telling me: 'No,
that's the law. When this happens to you, you hire a lawyer and you
get money. So now I have a lawyer." 40
Lawyers naturally focus on the bottom line (which is also their bot-
tom line), discouraging clients from seeking "blood money" from un-
insured or underinsured defendants. 41  By contrast, Schneider
National, the nation's largest trucking company, has a wholly owned
subsidiary, INS Insurance, which practices "empathic adjusting. '42
The widow of a man killed by a Schneider truck reported that if ad-
juster Frank Stackhouse had not been so kind "I'd have really thrown
my anger at him."' 43 Instead, she settled for millions less than several
lawyers estimated she could have won at trial because she felt that
would have entailed years of mourning and rage. She said, "If I did
not have Frank helping me ... I don't think I could have gotten
through it.''44 The most systematic British study found (unsurpris-
ingly) that victims' expectations (and presumably their sense of enti-
tlement) derived entirely from what their solicitors said they could
expenses. Id. Twenty-one percent felt others should get more than expenses and forty-eight
percent believed that they should get only expenses. Id. Consulting a lawyer reduced expecta-
tions of "profiting" from a lawsuit: thirty-six percent of those who had not consulted a lawyer
believed they should recover more than expenses, compared with eighteen percent of those who
had consulted a lawyer. Id.
38. David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song.- Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an
American Community, 18 LAW & Soc'y REV. 551, 561 (1984).
39. Id.
40. Lisa Belkin, Where 21 Youths Died, Lawyers Wage a War, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 18, 1990, at Al.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35
LAw & Soc'y REV. 275 (2001); see also C. Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study
of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609 (1994). Divorce lawyers simi-
larly divert clients from seeking moral vindication to the practical problems of dividing property.
Austin Sarat & William L. F. Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW
& Soc'y REV. 93 (1986); cf. Peter Margulies, "Who Are You To Tell Me That?": Attorney-Client
Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 213
(1990).
42. Adam Davidson, Working Stiffs, HARPER'S MAG., Aug. 2001, at 48.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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get.45 The limited survey research suggests that victims want a nomi-
nal payment beyond their out-of-pocket expenses, something like the
Roman law "solatium," to acknowledge their hurt.46
Indeed, anecdotes like these suggest that many victims have other
priorities such as safety. Cass Sunstein argues that "[t]he specific per-
formance remedy can be understood to stem from a resistance to com-
mensurability. ' 47  Although workers compensation is generally
portrayed as a compromise between workers (receiving certain liabil-
ity) and employers (receiving predictable, lower damages),48 some
employees wanted to control their risks through worker ownership. 49
A fourteen-year-old boy rendered paraplegic by a defective lap belt
recovered $3.3 million. But his father "became angry because Ford
refused to admit to anything .... I sat there three weeks through the
trial. It was like they were above everybody else, even after the jury
came in. Ford didn't care. They really didn't care. '50 His lawyers sub-
sequently filed a petition with the United States Department of Trans-
portation seeking to force Ford to recall 1.7 million cars.51
The father of a seven-year-old girl killed by a lawn dart spent the
next year trying to persuade the Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion to ban them.52 He told a sympathetic Senate subcommittee staff
member:
"My daughter's dead. She used to bring me home notes like yours,"
he said gesturing to a child's crayon drawings on the aide's bulletin
board. "Nobody knows what it's like who hasn't lost a child. I
wake up miserable. I go to bed miserable, and it's going to happen
to other people unless we do something. I'm here with my February
45. DONALD HARRIS ET AL., COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY 124
(1984).
46. HUNTING & NEUWIRTH, supra note 37; Jaffe, supra note 2; Jeffrey O'Connell & Rita
James Simon, Payment for Pain & Suffering: Who Wants What, When and Why?, 1972 U. ILL.
L.F. 1. French law awards a franc symbolique for the death of a child. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER,
PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 163-64 (1994).
47. Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 844
(1994).
48. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial
Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967).
49. EASTMAN, supra note 21; Jonathan Garlock, The Knights of Labor Courts: A Case Study
of Popular Justice, in 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
(Richard Abel ed., 1982).
50. Ordeal of Son's Auto Injury Spurs Father to Seek a Recall, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1988, § 1, at
39 (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Id.
52. Baker, Darts: Grieving Father Learns a Cruel Lesson in Government, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3,
1988, § 1, at 22.
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house payment-that bought my airline ticket. I've spent $12,000 on
this. 5
3
A coal miner's widow said, "It's not about the money . . . I don't
want this to happen to anyone else's husband. I want the company to
make things safer. But the money is the only thing you are allowed to
sue for."'54
Steven Sharp lost both arms in a defective bailer when he was six-
teen.5 Although he initially had no interest in suing, he made the
lawsuit a campaign to force the manufacturer to improve safety. But
though he won $4.3 million in compensatory damages and two million
dollars in punitives, the defendant did not recall the bailer or even
warn users.
56
Jodie S. Lane, a thirty-year-old doctoral candidate at Columbia
University Teachers College, was electrocuted through the fault of
Consolidated Edison (Con Ed) when she stepped on a metal plate in
the sidewalk while walking her dog.5 7 Con Ed paid her estate and
survivors $6.25 million (including $975,000 for pain and suffering),
some of which they planned to give to the Jodie S. Lane Public Safety
Foundation. 58 Con Ed also agreed to donate one million dollars to
Teachers College for a scholarship in her name and to create a panel
of three electrical safety experts (two chosen by the Foundation) to
monitor its improvements. 59 Both New York City and New York
State passed legislation requiring more inspections and reports.60 The
East Village Community Board (where she lived and the accident oc-
curred) renamed the street after her.61 Her father, an engineer who
researched the accident's cause, said: "Our family will never have clo-
sure because we will always live with the pain of this loss," but "hope-
fully it will help prevent the problems that caused our loss."'62
53. Id.
54. Lisa Belkin, Just Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 92, quoted in
Deborah R. Hensler, Money Talks: Searching for Justice Through Compensation for Personal
Injury and Death, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 417, 417 n.2 (2003).
55. WILLIAM MISHLER, A MEASURE OF ENDURANCE: THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF STEVEN
SHARP (2003).
56. Id.
57. Ian Urbina & Sabrina Tavernise, ConEd to Pay $72 Million in Electrocution Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 2004, at Al.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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Brandon Maxfield was rendered a quadriplegic at seven when a
Bryco pistol accidentally discharged. 63 Nine years later, he finally
won a twenty-four million dollar judgment, collecting $8.75 million
before Bryco declared bankruptcy. 64 With the backing of a philan-
thropically minded man who heard about the case from television
(and called it "a public-safety issue"), Maxfield bid $505,000 for the
company.65 His lawyer said Maxfield planned to destroy the 75,000
handgun frames included in the sale "to prevent other families from
going through the hell Maxfield and his family have. ' 66 But the for-
mer plant manager outbid him by $5,000.67 The manager first claimed
to be using his "life savings" but later admitted contributing little of
the purchase price. 68 He denied his former boss was buying back the
company but refused to disclose the source. 69
A mother whose son died in the World Trade Center attack said:
Someday, please God, I will see my son again .... I need to be able
to look at him and say, "Tommy, I did the right thing." The right
thing is not to take the government money. The right thing is to try
to get answers, to see what sort of lapses allowed the murderers to
do what they were able to do.70
Other relatives of September 11 victims have joined a wide variety of
groups dedicated to preventing a recurrence. 71
Apology is an institutionalized response to injury in Japan.72 When
a Japan Airlines plane crashed near Tokyo killing all passengers, the
63. Mike Anton, Shooting Victim Is Outbid for Costa Mesa Gun Maker, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13,
2004, at B5; Fox Butterfield, Teenager Fails In Bid to Buy Gun Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2004,
at A12.
64. Butterfield, supra note 63. After losing another lawsuit fourteen years earlier, the same
entrepreneur had sold his gun factory to his manager and then reconstituted it. Four years
before the recent bankruptcy, he told Business Week: "They can file for bankruptcy, dissolve, go
away until the litigation passes by, then reform and build guns to the new standards-if there is
one." Id.
65. Anton, supra note 63.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Martin Kasindorf, Some 9/11 Families Choose Lawsuits Over Federal Fund, USA TODAY,
July 14, 2003, at Al, quoted in Hensler, supra note 54, at 492 n.201 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
71. See Families of September 11, http://www.familiesofseptemberll.org (last visited Nov. 26,
2005); Skyscraper Safety Campaign, http://www.skyscrapersafety.org (last visited Nov. 26, 2005);
Give Your Voice, http://www.giveyourvoice.com (last visited Nov. 26, 2005); September llth
Families Association, http://www.911wvfa.org (last visited Nov. 26, 2005); WTC Family Group,
http://www.wtcufg.org (last visited Nov. 26, 2005); Peaceful Tomorrows, http://www.
peacefultomorrows.org (last visited Nov. 26, 2005).
72. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 13. The restorative justice movement seeks to extend
apology to western legal systems. See, e.g., Daniel W. Shuman, Role of Apology in Tort Law, 83
20061
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president traveled throughout the country to apologize to bereaved
relatives before accepting full responsibility by resigning. 73 When a
Japanese nuclear fuel plant leaked, the president bowed to those en-
dangered, even though they were not injured. 74
The United States occupies the other end of the spectrum: defense
lawyers strongly discourage clients from accepting any responsibil-
ity.75 But apology is all some victims want. After the Diocese of Or-
ange (California) announced it had settled the claims of ninety sexual
abuse victims for $100 million, forty-year-old Max Fisher, who had
been abused twenty-six years earlier, said, "I'm more pleased with the
fact that I got what I was after, which wasn't money, but an apology
from the church. The bishop pulled me aside and said, 'I'm deeply
sorry that this happened.' That meant more to me than anything."
Joelle Casteix, twenty-four, was equally emphatic about the diocese's
agreement to give a Los Angeles Superior Court judge all its docu-
ments concerning the cases, which would be reviewed for confidential-
ity and privilege before being released. She said, "For many years,
people have struggled to find out what the diocese knew and when it
knew it .... Any settlement that did not include these documents
would be nothing more than dirty money. '76
The father of a baby who suffered profound brain damage during a
negligent delivery said: "Show me an admission of guilt.., and I don't
want a thing."' 77 A father who blamed his son's fatal leukemia on
W.R. Grace, the defendant in A Civil Action, wanted a public declara-
tion of responsibility: "I didn't get into this for the money. I got into
this because I want to find them guilty for what they did. I want the
world to know that."' 78 The parent of a child killed in the bombing of
the Pan American plane over Lockerbie, Scotland, was "very pleased"
by the settlement. 79 He stated, "It says in front of the whole world
JUDICATURE 180 (2000); Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims
and Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15.
73. Id.
74. Howard W. French, Nuclear Peril Is Over But Japanese Anger Isn't, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,
1999, at Al.
75. The Automobile Association of America gives every insured instructions about what to do
"if you have an accident": "Do not admit responsibility for or discuss the circumstances of the
accident with anyone other than the police or an authorized Auto Club claims representative."
76. Nick Madigan, California Diocese Settles Sexual Abuse Case for $100 Million, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2005, at A16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES 367 (1998).
78. JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION 442 (1995).
79. Lynette Clemetson, Lockerbie Victims' Relatives See Glimmer of Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
16, 2003, at A6, quoted in Hensler, supra note 54, at 429.
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that the Libyan regime ordered this and that they're responsible. '80
But other parents felt that message was undercut by compensation.
One declared, "there is... no amount of money, that can restore what
I've lost.""' Another was even more emphatic: "This is supposed to
be about justice and the truth. Instead, what the Libyans proposed
amounted to a bribe. ' 82 Accepting the approximately $3,000 the Ger-
man government and industry recently paid each of the 130,681 Holo-
caust survivors, one insisted: "This money ... can never compensate
me for my lost family and childhood. '8 3 The chairman of the Ameri-
can Gathering of Jewish Holocaust Survivors, who also had been in
Auschwitz, insisted: "There must be limits to everything, even for-
giveness. '8 4 "[W]e will never equate morality and ethics in terms of
dollars and cents .... 5
Sandra Gilbert felt the same way about her husband's death, which
she blamed on medical malpractice: "money isn't the issue .... But
accountability is .. "86 A Dalkon Shield victim agreed: "I wouldn't
care if I hadn't gotten two cents out of it, if the publicity would make
people realize what a crummy company that is."'87 The victims of
friendly fire-a laser-guided 500-pound bomb dropped on American
soldiers in Iraq in 2003-wanted an accounting. Spc. Jeff Coyne, who
still suffers back pain and grieves for dead comrades, said: "I'm not
looking for somebody to spend their life in prison for whatever hap-
pened to me.... We just want the truth. ' 88 Samuel C. Oaks, who lost
a grandson he had raised, went further: "In court, they expect you to
show remorse when you've done something wrong. . . There's no
remorse here."8 9
Others want an official declaration of responsibility combined with
a recognition of the victim's loss-something like Biff's poignant cry
that "attention must be paid" to his father, Willie Loman, in Arthur
Miller's Death of a Salesman.90 In the continuing struggle by Holo-
80. Id., quoted in Hensler, supra note 54, at 429.
81. Id., quoted in Hensler, supra note 54, at 430.
82. Id., quoted in Hensler, supra note 54, at 431.
83. Clyde Haberman, Putting Price On Holocaust? Not Even Close, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2004,
at B1.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. SANDRA M. GILBERT, WRONGFUL DEATH: A MEDICAL TRAGEDY 217 (1995).
87. MORTON MINTz, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN AND THE DALKON SHIELD
13 (1985).
88. James Dao, Trail of Pain From Botched Attack in Iraq in '03, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2005, at
Al.
89. Id.
90. ARTHER MILLER, DEATH OF A SALESMAN 40 (Penguin Books 1998) (1949).
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caust victims and their descendants, one said: "What we are doing to-
day is rehumanizing these individuals posthumously and saying that
the grand theft that took place in fifteen countries was not permissi-
ble.... It's not about money." 91 The executive vice president of the
Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany agreed:
"We're not restituting money. We're restituting history. ' '92 Their in-
vestigation had uncovered new information about slave labor net-
works and medical experiments. "This is going to be a tool for
historians for generations to come."' 93 Damage claims can be acts of
historical witnessing.
Anecdotes cannot answer the question, "What do victims want?"
But they do cast doubt on the facile assertion that victims want only
money for pain and suffering. Any normative theory of damages must
also attend to victim concern with prevention, acknowledgement of
responsibility, and recognition of the wrong. General damages are at
best an indirect means towards these ends and at worst irrelevant, dis-
tracting, and inconsistent.
III. COMPENSABILITY
Later sections address the problems of equating money with experi-
ence: whether it can be done and the consequences of trying. But tort
law itself concedes that money cannot compensate all losses. The
most obvious example is death. Although all agree that the most
grievous loss is life itself, once life is lost money can do nothing for the
deceased-"You can't take it with you." (Of course, many cultures
believe that much can be done for the dead, both spiritually by way of
prayer and materially by means of food and clothing.) Consequently,
a tortfeasor pays no damages for the deceased's lost years. The impli-
cations, however, quickly become troubling. When nursing home neg-
ligence allegedly allowed an Alzheimer's patient to stray, the dispute
concerned the defendant's duty to the patient's adult daughters (the
court held it had none).94 Everyone took for granted there could be
no claim on behalf of the missing patient; because she was never
found, this wrong had no remedy. 95 When a hospital's negligence al-
legedly allowed a kidnapper to abduct a neonate, the dispute con-
91. JOHN AUTHERS & RICHARD WOLFFE, THE VICTIMS FORTUNE: INSIDE THE Epic BATTLE
OVER THE DEBTS OF THE HOLOCAUST 2 (2002).
92. Haberman, supra note 83.
93. Id.
94. Oresky v. Scharf, 510 N.Y.S.2d 897 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
95. Id. at 899.
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cerned the defendant's duty to the mother.96 Again the court held the
hospital had no duty, although the mother and not the fetus had con-
tracted with the hospital. Had the baby never been found again there
would have been no remedy. And though the baby's life was arguably
affected (if in unknowable ways), her mother's injury was entirely dis-
tinct (and arguably greater). 97
For similar reasons, many jurisdictions reject survival actions for
pain and suffering damages, which no longer can do anything for the
victim. 98 The New York Court of Appeals extended this reasoning to
reject loss of enjoyment claims by a comatose victim who lacked
"some level of awareness"-whatever this means.99 The dissenter in-
sisted the victim's loss was an "objective fact"-whatever that means.
The New York Appellate Division affirmed a survival action for pain
and suffering and lost enjoyment on behalf of a neonate who died
twelve days after birth. 100 And Kansas, West Virginia, and Ohio allow
such recovery. 10 1 A fourteen-year-old shot in the head lost cognitive
skills, inhibition, and also any memory of what he once had. 10 2 Should
he be compensated for a deficit of which he is unaware? Oliver Sacks
described a man whose chronic alcoholism had deprived him of any
memory: each day he greeted Sacks anew with a friendly blank stare,
convinced they had never met before. 10 3 If that profound amnesia
had been caused by negligence, should it be compensated?
If it makes little sense to "compensate" the dead for loss of life,
does it make any more to "compensate" the living for being denied
the lures of limbo, the solace of Lethe, the charms of nonexistence?
(Of course a defense lawyer could callously answer that the living can
always mitigate damages-by suicide. But the endowment effect here
96. Johnson v. Jamaica Hosp., 467 N.E.2d 502 (N.Y. 1984).
97. Id. at 504.
98. See, e.g., Williamson v. Plant Insulation Co., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 751 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
Other jurisdictions include Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Mary-
land, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Choctaw Maid Farms, Inc. v. Hailey, 822
So. 2d 911, 931 (Miss. 2000).
99. McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 376-77 (N.Y. 1989). Accord Keene v. Brigham &
Women's Hosp., 775 N.E.2d 725 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002), affd in part, 786 N.E.2d 824 (Mass.
2003); see generally MARILYN MINZER ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 4.21(3) (1989).
100. Cepeda v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 756 N.Y.S.2d 189, 190 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2003).
101. Gregory v. Carey, 791 P.2d 1329, 1336-37 (Kan. 1990); Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement
Prods. Co., 597 N.E.2d 474, 486 (Ohio 1992); Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433, 434 (W.
Va. 1982).
102. Haines v. Raven Arms, 640 A.2d 367 (Pa. 1994).
103. Oliver Sacks, The Lost Mariner, in THE MAN WHO MISTOOK His WIFE FOR A HAT AND
OTHER CLINICAL TALES (1987).
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is uniquely powerful.) "Miniver Cheevy, child of scorn /... wept that
he was ever born, / And he had reasons. o104 But Cheevy's reasons
would not persuade courts, which balk at compensating "wrongful
life."'01 5 One court stated, "[I]t is simply impossible to determine in
any rational or reasoned fashion whether the plaintiff has in fact suf-
fered an injury in being born impaired rather than not being born
.... 06 Another court said, "Recognizing this kind of claim on behalf
of the child would require us to weigh the harms suffered by virtue of
the child's having been born with severe handicaps against 'the utter
void of nonexistence'; this is a calculation the courts are incapable of
performing."1 0 7 In the words of a California court, "[T]here is no ra-
tional way to measure nonexistence or to compare non-existence with
the pain and suffering of impaired existence. ' 108 Whether "it is better
never to have been born at all than to have been born with even gross
deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be left to the philosophers
and the theologians."'' 0 9
At the other end of life, Ohio refused damages for wrongful prolon-
gation because "the 'benefit of life' [was] a harm which courts have
repeatedly refused to compensate." 110 The basis of the objection is
unclear and presumably multiple: existence will always be preferable
to nonexistence (but then how to understand suicide); money cannot
buy nonexistence (really a commensurability problem); there is no
way to measure the pain of existence (a calculability problem); dam-
ages for being born handicapped degrade the disabled (problems of
commodification and equality).
Because tort law awards no damages for lost years, it is often-
cheaper to kill rather than injure. (My students take a ghoulish de-
light in this further proof of law's perversity-until I remind them that
homicide remains a crime.) But tortfeasors who boast about killing
off their victims and offer a cost-benefit justification for their actions
provoke justified outrage.
Philip Morris bought the state tobacco industry from the Czech Re-
public in the early 1990s, soon capturing four-fifths of the domestic
104. EDWIN ARLINGTON ROBINSON, MINIVER CHEEVY (1910).
105. Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992); Estate of Taylor v. Muncie Medical Investors,
L.P., 727 N.E.2d 466 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671
N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996); Allore v. Flower Hosp., 699 N.E.2d 560 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
106. Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 963 (Cal. 1982).
107. Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (Nev. 1995).
108. Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
109. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978).
110. Allore, 699 N.E.2d at 563 (citing Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227-28).
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cigarette market."' When the Czech Parliament considered raising
cigarette taxes, Philip Morris commissioned an Arthur D. Little Inter-
national study, which announced that smoking saved the government
$23.2 to $30.6 million a year by eliminating healthcare, housing, and
long-term care for those it killed." 2 Prime Minister Milos Zeman, a
heavy smoker, once defended his habit: "As a smoker, I support the
state budget, because in the Czech Republic we pay tax on to-
bacco .... Also, smokers die sooner, and the state does not need to
look after them in their old age."'1 3 But that kind of Central Euro-
pean black humor was unacceptable coming from an American mul-
tinational. The leading Czech daily denounced the report as "first-
class cynicism and hyena-ism," comparing it to the Nazi SS, which cal-
culated the value of human life in its concentration camps: "What an
offer: 'come help us make money on the death of your citizens."' 114 A
government spokesman called it "ethically unacceptable to think and
write about human life in those categories. 11 5 American antismoking
activists quickly seized the opportunity to attack. The Campaign for
Tobacco-Free Kids said "a company that goes out of its way to ration-
alize as a good thing the fact that its products kill people doesn't de-
serve a seat at the table."'1 6 It joined two other antismoking groups to
buy full-page advertisements in leading American newspapers show-
ing a body on a morgue slab with a price tag on its toe: "$1,227. That's
how much a study sponsored by Philip Morris said the Czech Republic
saves on health care, pensions and housing every time a smoker
dies."1 17 New York Times columnist Bob Herbert condemned the
"brazen and profoundly unethical disregard of the value of human life
itself."11 8 Philip Morris quickly backtracked, noting that the report:
exhibited terrible judgment as well as a complete and unacceptable
disregard of base human values ... [It was] not just a terrible mis-
take. It was wrong. All of us at Philip Morris, no matter where we
111. Peter S. Green, Czechs Debate Benefits of Smokers' Dying Prematurely, N.Y. TIMES, July
21, 2001, at C2.
112. Cigarette Taxation and the Social Consequences of Smoking (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 4891, 1994), in TAX POL'Y & THE ECONOMY 9 (James M. Poterba
ed., 1995). W. Kip Viscusi, Harvard economist and law professor, gained notoriety by making
this argument a decade earlier.
113. David Holley, Philip Morris Angers Czechs with Tobacco Toll Report, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
5, 2001, at Al (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. For copy of ad placed by The Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, The American Cancer
Society, and Legacy, see Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/cam-
paign/printads/ad004.jpg (last visited Nov. 26, 2005).
118. Bob Herbert, Economics 101 at Big Tobacco U, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2001, at A17.
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work, are extremely sorry for this.... No one benefits from the very
real, serious and significant diseases caused by smoking.' 19
(Don't laugh.) The financing and release of the study "exhibited terri-
ble judgment as well as a complete and unacceptable disregard of ba-
sic human values.11 2 0 But though Philip Morris regretted the public
relations gaffe, no one acknowledged the basic mistake that Arthur
Little's economic analysis shared with tort law: disregard of the value
of lost years to the deceased.
If tort law excludes significant damages because victims cannot be
compensated, then arguments for general damages grounded in cor-
rective or distributive justice lose some of their force.
IV. COMMENSURABILITY
General damages exemplify the fallacy of starting with the only
remedy tort law offers-money-and applying it unreflectively to
every wrong, as in the Roman law maxim: Ubi remedium, ibi jus. 12 1
The (usually implicit) justification for doing so is Jeremy Bentham's
hedonic calculus: the claim that all experience can be measured in
positive and negative "utils," so that rewards can neutralize misfor-
tunes. 122 Of course, we all do this in response to daily stresses. A
recent study found that letting infants nurse during inoculations
seemed to relieve their pain.123 Parents have always known that hugs
and kisses eclipse pain. Students (and professors) reward themselves
for sustained periods of attention by taking breaks to eat, drink, and
chat. When my torts students discuss Joe Dial's experience, those who
award high general damages engage in something very much like Ben-
119. Holley, supra note 113.
120. Gordon Fairclough, Philip Morris Notes Cigarettes' Benefits for Nation's Finances, WALL
ST. J., July 16, 2001, at A2; see also Green, supra note 111; Herbert, supra note 118; Holley, supra
note, 113. The report, Public Finance Balance of Smoking in the Czech Republic, is available on
the Internet. Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, http://tobaccofieldsreekids.org/reports/
philipmorris/pmczechstudy.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2005).
121. Max Gluckman argued that the Lozi of Zambia reversed the maxim: ubi jus, ibi
remedium. MAX GLUCKMAN, THE IDEAS IN BAROTSE JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1965).
122. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLA-
TION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970). Elsewhere he referred to "hedos" and "dolors."
Id. Several contemporary commentators seem to adopt this view. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRA-
HAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 210 (2d ed. 2002); PETER CANE, ATIYAH'S
ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 351 (6th ed. 1999); JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDER-
STANDING REMEDIES 383 (1999); Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on
Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV. 772, 784-85 (1985); A.I. Ogus, Damages for Lost Amenities: For a
Foot, a Feeling or a Function?, 35 MOD. L. REV. 1, 8, 16 (1972); Richard N. Pearson, Liability to
Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm-A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary
Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477, 502 (1982).
123. Ricardo Carbajal, Analgesic Effect of Breast Feeding in Term Neonates: Randomized
Controlled Trial, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 13 (2003).
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tham's hedonic calculus. That reflects their contemporaneous experi-
ence. Most are poor while in law school and sinking deeper into debt.
They got where they are by postponing gratification. The more suc-
cessful they are in law school, the longer that postponement: it is hard
to party while billing over 2,000 hours annually. They sustain them-
selves with the hope (delusion?) that the extraordinary salary (and
even greater prize of partnership) will buy future pleasure.
But our ability to offset minor discomforts and self-denials with
small rewards should not mislead us to extrapolate that psychody-
namic to all pain and loss. Some of my students feel that the enormity
of Joe Dial's injuries renders money damages inappropriate. Others
find it incongruous to award money years after the injury (decades in
the case of minors). Consider Samantha Fishkin. 124 At twenty she
suffered a catastrophic accident in a car driven by her fianc6, Travis. 125
She had been a student at Lewis & Clark College with 1,500 SATs and
a gift for art.126 Fifteen reconstructive surgeries replaced every bone
in her face: "[h]er nose, eye sockets, and chin [were] refashioned out
of three ribs; her cheeks and jaw contained 37 titanium plates. ' 127 She
suffered profound amnesia and false memories. 128 She no longer
dreamed. Because her frontal lobes had been destroyed she lost all
internal censors-"talk[ing] incessantly about sex," "ask[ing] her fa-
ther and brother to make love to her, exploding at strangers, then
turning maudlin and infantile."'1 29 She insisted nothing was wrong
with her.130 But she could not tolerate crowds and gained fifty
pounds.131 The week after she released Travis from liability he broke
off their engagement. 132 She said, "I don't have any friends left....
My friends don't talk to me because they're scared of me .... They
think I'm in my bed drooling."'1 33 What could money do for her, or
Joe Dial? Some of the "jurors" in Neil Vidmar's simulations ex-
pressed similar skepticism: "Pain is a part of life and money will not
remove the pain"; 134 "We all go through hardships in life ... I do not
124. Peter Landesman, Speak, Memory, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2000, (Magazine), at 74.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Landesman, supra note 124.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE
MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS
210 (1997).
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feel anyone is deserving of massive amounts for an incident in her life
that she has totally recovered from except for memory"; 135 "as un-
compassionate as it may seem, I don't feel Dr.... should pay anything
for mental anguish because no amount can change her
disfigurement."]' 36
Philosophers have objected to utilitarianism on the basis of incom-
mensurability, 137 which Cass Sunstein defined as the impossibility of
finding a single metric to compare different goods.1 38 Although it is
appropriate to compensate strangers for causing inconvenience, it
would be highly inappropriate to offer to pay a friend for canceling a
lunch date, which would insult the friend and devalue the friend-
ship.139 More appropriate responses would include an apology and a
reaffirmation of the value of the friendship, perhaps by offering to
take the friend to lunch another time. Sunstein believes that incom-
mensurability enriches life. 140 Elizabeth Anderson defined two goods
as "incommensurable with respect to some scale if one is neither bet-
ter, worse, nor equal in value to the other in the respects measured by
the scale."'141 Although one of her examples is artistic excellence-
Velasquez or Picasso, for instance-another is more germane to my
inquiry: individual well-being. 42 Richard Warner argued that values
such as nature, beauty, nobility, honor, and loyalty are incommensura-
ble with money.143
Perhaps the best proof of incommensurability is our discomfort
when we encounter equivalences. Most people are repelled by mar-
kets for sex or votes, which are generally illegal. 144 One provocation
for the Reformation was the Catholic Church's sale of indulgences.
The law occasionally acknowledges the incommensurability of money
and experience. The Second Restatement of Torts, § 920 comment b,
refuses to set off a benefit from one "interest" (e.g., the emotional
rewards of parenting a baby who would never have been conceived or
135. Id.
136. Id. at 210, 217.
137. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 321-66 (1986); Joseph Raz, Value
Incommensurability: Some Preliminaries, 86 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc'y 117 (1985-86); see also
the sources cited in Sunstein, supra note 47, at 795-96 n.57.
138. Sunstein, supra note 47, at 780.
139. Id. at 785.
140. Id. at 854-55.
141. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 55 (1993).
142. Id.
143. Richard Warner, Topic in Jurisprudence: Incommensurability as a Jurisprudential Puzzle,
68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147 (1992).
144. Arild Vatn & Daniel W. Bromley, Choices Without Prices Without Apologies, 26 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 129 (1994).
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born but for medical malpractice) against the detriment to another
(the costs of childrearing).1 45 The New York Court of Appeals re-
fused to undertake "the jurisprudentially improper task of recasting
the immutable, intrinsic value of human life according to the financial
burden thus imposed upon the parents."1 46
Kenneth Feinberg, the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund
Special Master, told the mother of a dead firefighter: "I cannot make
you happy. I cannot bring people back.' t 47 The husband of a woman
who died in the attack said "there's no value for Gricelda. '' 148 A letter
to the New York Times called "dispensing money in an attempt to
alleviate pain and suffering . . . ludicrous and shortsighted. ' 149 The
fixed sum for noneconomic loss generated the greatest ire among sur-
vivors. 150 Sunstein argued that "[a] recognition of incommensurability
is necessary to keep alive the sense of tragedy .... ,,151
In order to unsettle a facile equivalence of pleasure with pain and to
make students question the commensurability of money and experi-
ence, I pose the following hypotheticals. If you suffered an injury
shortening your life expectancy, should you get money now in lieu of
old age? Students find that easy: they know that more money now can
increase their pleasure; and they cannnot imagine old people (like me)
having much fun. So it sounds like a pretty good deal. That is hardly
surprising: it is Faust's compact with Mephistopheles, updated for our
secular age by substituting the years medical science has wrested from
the Grim Reaper for the promise of an afterlife. Then I reverse the
exchange: what about Sleeping Beauty-the comatose victim who
eventually awakens? 52 Can money spent late in life make up for the
loss of youth? That is a harder question, but most students still be-
lieve it is better than nothing. Therefore, they have even less difficulty
with the case of a neonate repeatedly hospitalized for projectile
145. Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603 (N.M. 1991); Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450
N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1990).
146. O'Toole v. Greenberg, 477 N.E.2d 445, 448 (N.Y. 1985).
147. Belkin, supra note 54.
148. Id.
149. Paul Krieger, Just Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2002, at 8.
150. Belkin, supra note 54; Hensler, supra note 54; see also David Barstow, Final Rules for
Federal Victims' Fund Increase Aid to Families of Sept. 11 Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2002, at B4;
David Barstow, U.S. May Approve More Aid For Kin Of Sept. 11 Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5,
2002, at Al.
151. Sunstein, supra note 47, at 859 (citing GuiDo CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBIT, TRAGIC
CHOICES 57-64 (1978)).
152. Oliver Sacks offers a vivid description in the context of sleeping sickness in OLIVER
SACKS, AWAKENINGS (1987). Pedro Almod6var beautifully evokes this in the movie Talk To
Her. HABLE CON ELLA (Columbia Tri-Star 2002).
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vomiting and dehydration during much of her first year, who recovers
completely, with no retrievable memory of the experience (as far as
doctors and psychologists can tell). But how does money at majority
compensate for pain, suffered decades earlier that left no measurable
trace? 153
If money is incommensurable with worldly suffering, it is even less
commensurable (if that condition admits of degrees) with spiritual
harm. The New York Court of Appeals bizarrely held that a hospital
whose surgeon had circumcised a four-day-old boy breached no duty
to the parents, who had elected to have the circumcision performed by
a mohel on the eighth day. 154 But if the lawsuit had been brought by
the son (to whom a duty was owed, although he could not contract),
would money damages have been appropriate for this breach of the
Chosen People's covenant with God? And what about other "relig-
ious malpractice": a faulty marriage that left the couple living in sin
and bastardized their children? Or defective last rites, which dis-
patched the unpurged soul straight to Hell? That was Hamlet's only
regret about killing Polonius:
Cut off even in the blossoms of my sin,
Unhouseled, disappointed, unaneled,
No reck'ning made, but sent to my account
With all my imperfections on my head. 155
Relational harms pose similar questions. Although wrongful death
originally was limited to the pecuniary loss of those economically de-
pendent on the deceased, courts have expanded damages to include
the many forms of grief.156 But what can money do? One jury disre-
garded the judge's instructions to award damages for the survivor's
pain and suffering because they believed "the pain would diminish
with time . . . we all lose loved ones . . . we learn to adapt . . . no
amount of money would compensate for the ache. '157
Relatives of those killed when an Air Florida plane crashed into the
Potomac immediately after take off from National Airport in 1982
were still suffering twenty years later.158 Patrick Zondler was
nineteen when his father died and said, "I go through phases where I
wish I had my father to talk to .... To get his advice, his perspective
153. Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 5C0 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).
154. Kalina v. Gen. Hosp., 195 N.E.2d 309 (N.Y. 1963).
155. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 5, lines 76-79.
156. Green v. Bittner, 424 A.2d 210 (N.J. 1980) (discussing the "pecuniary value, excluding
emotional loss" of child's companionship).
157. VIDMAR, supra, note 134, at 245.
158. Emily Yoffe, Afterward, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, (Magazine), at 36.
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on things, on some choices I'm going to have to make at work."' 159
Anthony Ivener, who was sixteen when his father was killed, said,
"The hardest thing is not having my father know my family.... Not
having my father know what I've done with my life."1 60 Joy Friedberg
was thirty when her twenty-six-year-old brother died.16' For two de-
cades she had remembered him on every significant day.' 62 She
stated, "There's a tenacity the dead have on the living that no living
person has on you .... The dead are truly gone. The only way you
have to keep them is to think about them over and over again. u63
Loss of consortium explicitly claims to compensate the physically
unharmed spouse for the diminished relationship caused by the
other's physical injury. But in what sense is the plaintiff made whole
by being given money after a loved one has been injured? What is the
money for? Arrah Dial clearly would have been entitled to a substan-
tial loss of consortium award. What does the law expect her to do
with the money? Buy sexual and emotional services from a gigolo?
Divorce Joe and use the money like a dowry to enhance her chances
on the remarriage market? In fact, many marriages dissolve in the
wake of profound injury. California first acknowledged a wife's claim
for loss of consortium in a case where her twenty-two-year-old hus-
band was paralyzed from the chest down, depriving him of bowel and
bladder control.1 64 The twenty-year-old wife stopped working to care
for him around the clock, turning him during the night, washing and
dressing him, helping him urinate and defecate. Their hopes for a
large family were destroyed. A student who knew the couple said
they divorced soon after she received a large judgment.
In what seemed like the archetypal fairy tale, a hospital negligently
switched two babies at birth. When this was discovered three years
later, the grandparents of one child (whose parents had died in an
unrelated accident) accepted the two million dollar settlement, which
the parents of the other child rejected. 165 What was the money for?166
Disregarding the judge's instructions, jurors awarded no loss of con-
sortium to a man whose wife had suffered permanent brain injury im-
pairing her hearing, vision, speech, memory, and balance so badly she
159. Id.
160. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
164. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1974).
165. Family of Switched Girl Accepts a Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1999, at A16.
166. A California court refused to award damages when the mistake was rectified more
quickly. Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 249 P.2d 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952).
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could no longer engage in childcare, cooking, shopping, and driving.
Jurors felt that he had taken the marriage vow to love and cherish "in
sickness and in health." 167
Emotional responses to death are as complex as feelings about the
living. The Air Florida crash also killed Robert Silberglied, a promis-
ing Harvard scientist. His older sister, Joan, the black sheep of the
family, had always resented him and was furious at her mother's ob-
session with Robert's death. Joan stated, "She made a spectacle of
herself over it."'168 How would money address the very different ex-
periences of Joan and her mother?
Hard cases do not make bad law; they just expose the existing defi-
ciencies. A reporter interviewed four victims dissatisfied with the
$250,000 cap on pain and suffering imposed by California's 1975 Med-
ical Injuries Compensation Reform Act (MICRA). 69 But would an
uncapped award have been any more satisfactory? A surgeon left
gauze and a sponge inside Candy Negrete. 170 "I started growing an-
other breast underneath my armpit ...now I have this deformed
breast" and an understandable phobia of doctors. 171 Dan Wingerd's
kidney was transplanted on the wrong side, destroying his remaining
kidney.172 Said Wingerd, "I didn't even get the pleasure of a single
urination ... I have to start over again on the transplant list, because
now I'm not dealing with a family member's donated kidney." 173 He
had to stop working because he could not travel. He noted, "I'm in
dialysis for five hours."1 74
Kim Tutt was given three months to live after being diagnosed with
cancer of the jaw.175 She agreed to radical surgery in the hope of an-
other three months with her children, ten and twelve. 176 Said Tutt,
"Whatever time I could get was worth it.' 177 The surgeon removed
her entire chin, from the left side to behind her right ear, replacing it
with her fibula. But the diagnosis was wrong; she never had cancer. 78
[I]t was hard telling the boys I had cancer.., but it was even harder
telling them that I didn't. I am permanently disfigured. I've under-
167. VIDMAR, supra note 134, at 241-43.
168. Yoffe, supra note 158, at 41. (internal quotation marks omitted).
169. Susan Burton, The Biggest Mistake of Their Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2003, at 48.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Burton, supra note 169.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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gone five surgeries. I'm still missing nine teeth. Chewing is not
easy. People notice that I'm not normal-that really, really bothers
the boys.. .179 [but] ... money will not change what my family has
been through." 18
0
Profound injury, like serious illness, transforms lives. 181 But though
no one would choose to suffer the transformation, those different lives
are just that-different, neither better nor worse-incommensurable
with each other and incapable of being given a financial equivalent.
Brandon Erickson lost an arm when his National Guard convoy was
ambushed in Iraq. 18 2 Two years later he is still self-conscious when
people stare, but in his words:
that whole negative thing of complaining about, you know, the war,
you know. I quit talking about that a long time ago .... Just, you
know, let it go... It's more of like I'm just, if it doesn't work out the
way you want to, you know, find a way to make it work out.... Last
July 22nd [the first anniversary of the attack] was when I proposed
to Dana [his wife]. I tried to turn a bad day into a good day... I lost
a friend that day, I lost an arm that day, and, you know, changed my
life forever, but I also gained a wife .... 183
A deaf lesbian couple chose a deaf sperm donor to ensure that their
two birth children would be deaf. The Washington Post story elicited
letters from outraged hearing readers; one called it child abuse; the
mother of two children born deaf, who gave both cochlear implants,
proudly declared they had "never learned sign language and don't
need it to communicate. 1 84 The adopting couple, however, presuma-
bly believed that their lives and those of their children were different
by reason of their deafness-but not diminished.
In rejecting a wrongful birth claim by the parents of a healthy child,
the Washington Supreme Court emphasized the impossibility of pre-
dicting whether the outcome would be good or bad. The court said,
"The child may turn out to be loving, obedient and attentive, or hos-
tile, unruly and callous. The child may grow up to be President of the
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. On the effect of illness, see ARTHUR W. FRANK, THE WOUNDED STORY TELLER: BODY,
ILLNESS AND ETHICS (1995).
182. All Things Considered: Interview: Brandon Erickson Discusses His Life After Losing His
Arm in an Attack in Iraq (National Public Radio broadcast July 23, 2005).
183. Id.
184. Letter, Like Mother, Like Child, Letters, WASH. POST, June 9, 2002, at W4; see also Liza
Mundy, A World of Their Own, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2002, (Magazine), at 22. I learned this
from JUDITH DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 380-81 (2005).
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United States, or to be an infamous criminal. 1 85 (The court might
have added: parents may cherish an unruly child who turns into a no-
torious criminal more than a dutiful one who becomes President.)
One of the few survivors of the Air Florida crash was a flight at-
tendant, who suffered a broken wrist and ankle, a permanent six-inch
scar on the back of her thigh, and persistent survivor guilt. Just before
the crash she bar-hopped from Miami to the Florida Keys.' 86 After-
wards, she said, "I had a U-turn and I changed .... It just really was
like God reached out and grabbed onto me. ' 187 Another survivor, a
sixty-three-year-old GTE executive in the middle of a divorce, re-
turned to his parents to convalesce. His father, a former Green Beret,
cleaned the pins inserted into his shattered leg, while his mother held
his head in her lap. 88 He said, "I really got back in touch with my
feelings and my family.... That's the joy side."'18 9 But he still suffered
chronic pain, lost his career, and called himself "a semi-recluse with a
lot of infirmities." 190
After two years of treatment, Samantha Fishkin started trying to
recover her memories.191 Volunteering to read to children at the Cen-
tral Park Zoo, she found that her lack of inhibition made her a better
performer. She said, "I can use my little kid voice and they like that.
I'm cute, and I'm kind of floppy. They don't feel they have to defend
themselves against me."'1 92 She had abused drugs and alcohol before
the accident. Now, she declared, "I am reborn. . . . It's a second
chance. I care about myself and what I do now. I've become a
woman."'1 93 Triumphantly walking the few blocks from her apartment
to the rehabilitation center for the first time, she said: "I see people in
wheelchairs. I used to get annoyed, they were too slow. 'Outta my
way.' Now I say, 'Been there; done that; good luck.'"1 94
Two of the badly burned survivors of the Station nightclub fire in
West Warwick, Rhode Island, shared a hospital room. Despite their
very different personalities, they bonded during the unimaginably
painful treatment process (similar to Joe Dial). One said: "I'm there
185. McKernan v. Aasheim 687 P.2d 850, 855 (Wash. 1984). For a poignant account of the
impossibility of assigning a money value to the cost of an unplanned child, see David K. DeWolf,
Teaching Harbeson, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 527 (2004).
186. Yoffe, supra note 158.
187. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
188. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
189. Id.
190. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
191. Landesman, supra note 124.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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to cheer him up and take him out of his anger. And when it's my turn
for a bad moment, [he] takes me out of my sadness."'1 95
Maria Hanson was a model "on the verge of stardom .... ,196
When she rebuffed the advances of her obsessed landlord, he hired
two men to slash "her face with a razor."'1 97 After months of opera-
tions and an ordeal as a prosecution witness against the landlord, who
accused her of inviting the attack, she became profoundly depressed.
But after years of therapy she started a family and developed a suc-
cessful career as a motivational speaker. 198
Joe Dial's story is even more startling. Eight years after the acci-
dent a reporter found him volunteering to care for dialysis patients, to
whom he was drawn by his expertise in medical technology (the career
he had lost). 199 He played chess weekly with a man who had endured
five hours of dialysis three times a week for five years. Both were
competitive and argumentative. Dial was the first person to be
honored by the dialysis center for donating a hundred hours; he dis-
liked the fuss but submitted to the publicity in order to motivate
others.200 He was spending three hours a day on his investments but
not working otherwise. He had two more children (ages three years
and two weeks) and felt he had adjusted well. Dial said, "It hurts to
live, but what a joy!" 201 Thirteen years after the accident (which he
could not remember), working as a senior engineer at Bell Technical
Operations, he felt "fortunate" and "lucky. ' 20 2 He had to avoid the
sun, but "that's something I should have always done anyway." Dur-
ing reconstructive surgery "I would get up in the morning, look in the
mirror and say, 'Well, it won't be long now.' Then I realized the scars
would never go away. ' 20 3 He continued:
I think all that money has had more impact on friendships than my
physical appearance. I can do a lot of things other people can't be-
cause of it. But maybe I'm using that as a crutch. Maybe I think
people don't like me because I have a lot of money-not because I
look funny.
195. Mary Duenwald, Tales From a Burn Unit: Agony, Friendship, Healing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
18, 2003, at Fl.
196. Greater Talent Network, http://www.greatertalent.com/biography.php?id=191 (last vis-
ited Nov. 27, 2005).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Weekly Hospital Sessions Nurture Bonds of Friendship, ARIZONA DAILY STAR, May 27,
1979, at J3.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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Still, he did not regret the accident and even was grateful, stating "It
brought me closer to God and to my family. Sure, there are times you
think that the world doesn't care. But you have to have the assurance
that everything happens for the best. I wouldn't want to go back to
what I was before. No way."'2 04
Or consider the following story, which even O'Henry might have
thought far-fetched.20 5 When Linda Riss was twenty-two she met
thirty-year-old Burton Pugach, one of the most successful plaintiffs'
personal injury lawyers in the Bronx, who owned a house, an airplane,
and a stake in a Long Island nightclub. 20 6 When, after a year, he
failed to make good his promise to divorce, she broke up with him. z07
For six months he followed her home from work nightly or jumped
out of the bushes beside her door.20 8 He carried a gun and threatened
to kill her if she rejected him.20 9 Although she repeatedly called the
police, the desk officer said they could do nothing because Pugach was
a lawyer.210 Linda began a relationship with twenty-three-year-old
Larry Schwartz. Pugach called her at the engagement party and
warned that if he could not have her, "no one else will have you. And
when I get through with you, no one else will want you. ' 211 The next
day a man threw lye in her face, permanently scarring and ultimately
blinding her.212 Three months later Schwartz broke off the engage-
ment.213 Pugach was convicted of paying three men $2,000 for the
assault and received a fifteen to thirty year sentence. Many know this
much of story from the notorious New York Court of Appeals deci-
sion holding that the police had no duty to protect her214 -a position
that provokes passionate debate among my students.
204. ARIZONA DAILY STAR, Feb. 26, 1985, at 1A.
205. "O'Henry" was the pen name used by William Sidney Porter. See O'HENRY, SIXES AND
SEVENS (1911).
206. Mark Fass, A Sort of Love Story, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, at § 14.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Fass, supra note 206.
213. Id.
214. Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 861 (N.Y. 1968).
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Then I tell the denouement.215 Pugach wooed Riss from prison,
writing her regularly for fourteen years. He divorced his wife.216 For-
bidden by his parole to talk to her, he proposed to her via the televi-
sion news cameras filming his release.217 Eight months later they
married.2 18 Although disbarred, he became a prosperous and politi-
cally well-connected "paralegal" in Queens. But in 1991 he began an
affair with Evangeline Borja, a married woman twenty-eight years
younger, who worked in his building. 219 They breakfasted together
daily and made love in his office. 220 After five years of feeling ne-
glected on weekends, however, she ended the affair and began seeing
a man thirteen years younger than her.221 Pugach offered to divorce
Linda, marry Borja, buy her a house, take her to Europe, buy her a
mink coat, and give her a million dollars.222 After she rebuffed him,
she claimed he threatened to kill her and physically abused her.223
She complained to the police. This time they charged Pugach with
harassment and sexual abuse.224 When Johnnie Cochran did not re-
turn his calls (despite Pugach's belief that Cochran "needs another big
case") Pugach defended himself.225 Throughout the six-day trial (his
first ever) the judge sustained the constant prosecution objections to
Pugach's questions and denied his repeated motions for a mistrial.226
But the jury of three men and three women found him guilty only of
misdemeanor harassment in the second degree, which carried a maxi-
mum fine of $250 and fifteen days in jail (some of which he had al-
ready served). 227 Pugach claimed vindication, calling the prosecution
political: "Here's a D.A. who, because of the notoriety surrounding
215. Roy GRUTMAN & BILL THOMAS, LAWYERS AND THIEVES (1990); BERRY STAINBACK, A
VERY DIFFERENT LOVE STORY: BURT AND LINDA PUGACH'S INTIMATE AccouNT OF THEIR
TRIUMPH OVER TRAGEDY (1976); Fass, supra note 206; Norimitsu Onishi, Two Tales of Soured
Affairs of the Heart Intersect in a Courtroom in Queens, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1997, at B3 [herein-
after Onishi, Two Tales]; Norimitsu Onishi, Jury Clears Man, 70, of Abuse Charges, N.Y. TIMES,
May 1, 1997, at B3 [hereinafter Onishi, Jury Clears Man].
216. Onishi, Two Tales, supra note 215.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Onishi, Jury Clears Man, supra note 215.
220. Onishi, Two Tales, supra note 215.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Onishi, Jury Clears Man, supra note 215.
227. Id.
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me, wanted to score political points. ' '228 Linda loyally agreed: "What
a waste of taxpayers' money."229
Tort law would never consider setting off these life changes as "ben-
efits," any more than it would allow a negligent car driver who strikes
a pedestrian to set off against the damages inflicted the fact that the
victim missed a flight that crashed, killing all aboard. (Indeed, the
logic of such a set off would allow the tortfeasor to sue the victim in
quantum meruit.) The reason is not just predictability; we could dis-
count the alleged benefit by the probability that the victim would have
missed that flight for another reason. Rather it is that we, not our
circumstances, determine the value of our lives. The miserable rich
and the contented poor are literary clich6s. Cultural conventions may
make it easier to be happy with some lives than with others, but they
certainly do not dictate the outcome. One fascinating study found
that emergency healthcare providers evaluated the lives of traumati-
cally injured spinal cord patients (a category they all had encoun-
tered) as far less satisfactory than the patients evaluated
themselves. 230 The providers were much less likely to imagine they
would be glad to be alive with tetraplegia (eighteen percent) than the
injured patients themselves (ninety-two percent), to believe their
quality of life years later would be at least average (seventeen percent
versus eighty-six percent), and to expect patients to be sexually active
(ten percent versus sixty-six percent of patients who were indeed sex-
ually active).231
V. COMMODIFICATION
The problem of commensurability is the difficulty of constructing
equivalences between any two ontologically different phenomena.
Marx focused his harshest criticism on the particular equivalences cre-
ated by the market, which reduces everything to the commodity form:
Could commodities themselves speak, they would say: Our use-
value may be a thing that interests men. It is no part of us as ob-
jects. What, however, does belong to us as objects, is our [ex-
change] value. Our natural intercourse as commodities proves it.
In the eyes of each other we are nothing but exchange value.232
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. K.A. Gerhardt & J. Kaziol-McLain et al., Quality of Life Following Spinal Cord Injury:
Knowledge and Attitudes of Emergency Care Providers, 23 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 977
(1999).
231. Id.
232. Karl Marx, The Fetishism of Commodities, in CAPITAL IN ESSENTIAL WORKS OF SOCIAL-
ISM 133, 144 (Irving Howe ed., 1976).
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Commodities assume independent lives, in which they own people
rather than vice versa. Marx is commonly said to have turned Hegel
on his head. But he was also (critically) observing how the market
violated Kant's categorical imperative: "So act as to treat humanity,
whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as
an end withal, never as a means only. '233 Marx's particular target, of
course, was the capitalist commodification of labor.234 Georg Simmel
generalized that critique, "[T]he more money dominates interests and
sets people and things into motion, the more objects are produced for
the sake of money and are valued in terms of money, the less can the
value of distinction be realized in men and in objects. '235
Extreme forms of commodification still shock. Slavery allows the
sale of people, not just their labor power. Thomas Hardy grabbed his
readers' attention by beginning The Mayor of Casterbridge with a
drunk Michael Henchard selling his wife and daughter to a sailor for
five guineas. 236 Despite its abolition in the nineteenth century, slavery
continues to be discovered in my own city, Los Angeles: Thai workers
imprisoned in an El Monte clothing factory237 and a Culver City tele-
vision producer who enslaved his Filipino maid.238
When the market for children's life insurance exploded in the late
nineteenth century, critics declared "there should be no bargaining or
trafficking in our Commonwealth under our auspices, in infant life
which has been held sacred. . . . No manly man and no womanly
woman ... should be ready to say that their infants have pecuniary
value. ' 239 I remember being bemused when my children's school en-
rollment provoked repeated sales pitches from direct mail solicitors
proposing to insure their lives. What good would money do, I won-
dered, if they died? Socialist states rejected nonpecuniary damages:
"Only the bourgeoisie thinks that mental suffering can be cured by
233. Theory of Ethics, in KANT SELECrIONS 268, 309 (Theodore Meyer Greene ed., 1929).
234. On the problem of subjecting all human life to the market, illustrated by consideration of
prostitution, baby-selling, and surrogate motherhood, see Bernard Barber, The Absolutization of
the Market: Some Notes on How We Got From There to Here, in MARKETS AND MORALS (G.
Dworkin et al. eds., 1977); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849
(1987).
235. GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY 390-91 (Tom Bottomore & David Frisby
trans., 1990).
236. THOMAS HARDY, THE MAYOR OF CASTERBRIDGE 12 (Penguin Books 2003) (1886).
237. See Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450 (D. Cal. 1996); see also Bureerong v.
Uvawas, 959 F. Supp. 1231 (D. Cal. 1997).
238. Richard Verrier, New Damages in Labour Suit, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2004, at C2; Richard
Verrier, Sony Pictures Exec, Wife Liable in Labor Lawsuit, L.A. TIMES, Aug, 27, 2004, at C1.
239. ZELIZER, supra note 46, at 123.
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money, and like commodities, can be exchanged by currency." 240
Richard Posner's provocative proposal for a market in babies con-
ferred just the notoriety he craved.241
The hunger for recognition is rarely satiated. Athletes and enter-
tainers exploit their celebrity to market goods. Sean P. "Diddy"
Combs, Jessica Simpson, and Alicia Keys have made infomercials for
Proactiv Solution (an acne-fighting product). 242 Hilary Duff, Freddie
Prinze, Jr., Andie McDowell, Britney Spears, Jackie Chan, Spike Lee,
and Tyra Banks, among others, sported a milk moustache for the "Got
Milk" campaign. 243 Bette Midler, Lillian Hellman, and Joan Craw-
ford, among many others, declared that a Blackglama mink became
them most.244 Environmental groups promote polluters: "World Wide
Fund for Nature endorsing Procter & Gamble's paper diapers and
soap powder. ' 245 Aristocrats franchise themselves: Earl Spencer golf
clubs, Duchess of York children's books, Prince Charles's biscuits.
Even more insidiously, ordinary people now push products to friends
and strangers without revealing they are hucksters. 246 Indeed, many
of these shills felt they were rendering a service rather than demean-
ing themselves as human commercials; they were motivated less by
money than cultural superiority and recognition for being hip (what
David Riesman once derided as "inside dopesterism"). 247 As adver-
tising becomes omnipresent-in schools, in public spaces, in buildings,
on all goods and services, and perhaps even in space-noncommercial
behavior begins to seem unnatural, pointless, boring. Arlie Russell
Hochschild has written eloquently about the "commercialization of
human feeling" in service occupations that simulate emotion.248 Por-
nography is as old as art, but the newer technologies of photography,
film, television, cable, video, and the internet have dramatically ex-
panded the market and allowed us all to become exhibitionists with-
out ever leaving home.
240. Id. at 161.
241. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 409-17 (1992); Elisabeth M. Landes & Rich-
ard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978). But see
Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1987). For a
critique, see ZELIZER, supra note 46, at 169.
242. Rob Walker, The Celebrity Solution, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, at 30.
243. Whymilk.com, http://www.whymilk.com (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
244. See Advertising, Marketing, and Commercial Imagery Collections, http://americanhis-
tory.si.edu/archives/d7611.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
245. RICHARD L. ABEL, SPEAKING RESPECT, RESPECTING SPEECH 167 (1998).
246. Rob Walker, The Hidden (in Plain Sight) Persuaders, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2004, at 69.
247. DAVID RIESMAN ET AL., THE LONELY CROWD: A STUDY OF THE CHANGING AMERICAN
CHARACTER (1950).
248. ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF
HUMAN FEELING (1983); VIVANA ZELIZER, THE PRICE OF INTIMACY (2005).
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Medical technology not only confers incalculable benefits but also
allows commodification of new social domains. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, some jurisdictions prohibited the trade in cadavers (in turn creat-
ing a black market of grave robbers). Charles Dickens sought to
evoke sympathy for Silas Wegg, who wanted his amputated leg back
from Mr. Venus, a skeleton merchant.2 49 More recently (and from
different motives) a leukemia patient (unsuccessfully) asserted a legal
claim to his spleen, removed in the course of treatment.250 Although
the United States has outlawed markets in organs, poor people in
third world countries sell theirs to rich recipients.251 An Israeli entre-
preneur flew impoverished Brazilians to South Africa for kidney
transplants, paying donors up to $10,000 but charging recipients up to
$120,000.252 The film Dirty Pretty Things (melo)dramatized this trade
in England. 25 3 The founder of Stanley H. Kaplan Educational Centers
pushed the envelope of legality by offering $5,000 for a bone marrow
transplant for his great nephew, who had leukemia.254
Cosmetic surgery lets people commodify themselves by remaking
their bodies to resemble those idealized by the media-the latest twist
on worshipping graven images. The New Me Surgical Institute offers
the usual range of operations, including Botox ($150), full face lifts
($3,499), breast augmentation ($2,999) and reduction ($3,999), lip aug-
mentation ($999), and nasal resculpture ($2,999).255 (Of course,
nonmarket societies mandate even more extreme self-mutilation in
pursuit of culturally constructed concepts of beauty: piercing, cutting,
flattening, engorging, extending, and tattooing.)
People commodify their progeny too. There is a long-established
market for sperm, which are cheap and hence not very profitable be-
cause production is pleasurable, brief, and risk-free (despite eons of
religious and quack condemnation of onanism). 256 The Genetics &
IVF Institute has sought higher profits by offering MicroSort, "a
249. CHARLES DICKENS, OUR MUTUAL FRIEND (Penguin Books 1997) (1865). The example
appears in Richard Warner, Incommensurability as a Jurisprudential Puzzle, 68 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 147, 148 (1992).
250. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480 (Cal. 1990).
251. Desperation: Selling Your Eye, Kidney, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1981, § 1, at 1. On the
ethical arguments, see MARK J. CHERRY, KIDNEY FOR SALE BY OWNER (2005).
252. Michael Wines, 14 Arrested in Brazil and South Africa for Alleged Human Organ Traffic,
INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Dec. 6, 2003.
253. DIRTY PRETTY THINGS (Miramax Films 2003).
254. Gina Kolata, Transplant Reward Offer Raises Furor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1989, at A6.
255. Advertisement, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2004, at A24.
256. THOMAS W. LAQUEUR, SOLITARY SEX: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF MASTURBATION
(2004); DAVID PLOTZ, THE GENIUS FAcTORY: THE CURIOUS HISTORY OF THE NOBEL PRIZE
SPERM BANK (2005).
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highly important new sperm separation technique for preconceptual
gender selection .... ",257 But eggs are different. The oldest profes-
sion is the sale not of sex but of women's reproductive capacity (which
used to be owned by fathers or brothers but now, after feminism, be-
longs to women). Because American law does not classify human
eggs as organs, they have been thoroughly commodified.25 8 Indeed,
religious opponents of abortion and stem cell research should favor
the commodification of eggs, which generates children who otherwise
would never be born; such critics might even embrace a market for
babies as a disincentive for abortion. (eBay, interestingly, refuses to
sell either sperm or eggs.) 259 There were 7,000 egg transplants in 1998,
a figure that had been doubling every two to three years.260 Donors
must undergo weeks of hormone shots. Commercial brokers adver-
tise in elite college newspapers, promising (if rarely delivering) six-
figure payments. 261 An ad in the UCLA Daily Bruin offered $80,000
to Caucasian women with SATs above 1300, adding: "Extra compen-
sation available for someone who might be especially gifted in athlet-
ics, science/mathematics or music .... "262 The director of "A Perfect
Match" explained: "You don't go to a community college to get some-
one with a 1400 SAT .... You go to the Ivy League. 2 63 A typical
buyer might say, "I would really hate to have a fat kid. I want the
donor to be tall, blond, athletic and with SATs over 1400." Online
registries allow buyers to select hair and eye color, ethnicity, height,
and education. A Manhattan Beach broker sent prospective buyers
photos of donors in bikinis. 264
257. Genetics & IVF Institute, http://www.givf.com (last visited Nov. 27, 2005). "Single
Mothers by Choice" is an organization that has twenty-four chapters. About three-fourths of its
4,000 members have bought sperm from banks, which charge $150-$600 per vial and identify
donors by such traits as their medical history, ethnicity, physical characteristics, and answers to
questions such as, "What is the funniest thing that ever happened to you?" Single Mothers by
Choice, at http://mattes.home.pipeline.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2006). Additionally, Fairfax Cry-
obank, a well known sperm bank, charges more for Ph.D. donors. Amy Harmon, First Comes
the Baby Carriage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2005, at G1. *
258. See Carey Goldberg, On Web, Models Auction Their Eggs to Bidders for Beautiful Chil-
dren, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1999, at All; Kenneth R. Weiss, Eggs Buy a College Education, L.A.
TIMES, May 27, 2001, at Al; Ron's Angels, http://www.ronsangels.com (last visited Nov. 27,
2005). On the legal and ethical issues see Reproductive Technologies and the Quest for Perfec-
tionism, in DAAR, supra note 184.
259. Goldberg, supra note 258.
260. Weiss, supra note 258.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
264. Id.
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One website pictures women, gives their measurements, and lists
their accomplishments. 265 Its creator (a commercial photographer)
asked rhetorically: "If you could increase the chance of reproducing
beautiful children and thus giving them an advantage in society, would
you?" ' 2 6 6 It would be "very unfair to put a limit on a girl's ability to
make money. ' 267 Paying them all the same would be "like saying all
women are the same, which is not the case. '268 "A tall strawberry
blond with a creamy complexion and blue-green eyes," who was com-
pleting a Harvard Ph.D., sold seventeen eggs in San Francisco for
$18,000, prompting her to ask for a little more in San Diego seven
months later.269 The first couple was particularly attracted by her
five-foot-eleven-inch height and Norwegian ancestry. 270 Other pro-
spective buyers asked about her tennis game and measured her shoul-
ders.271 Julia Derek, a Swedish college student in the United States,
donated eggs twelve times, earning "slightly over $50,000."272 She
said, "I didn't even have a green card at the time, so my options were
very limited. This was, like, the best solution for me and lots of
money for it and no tax on it. And it seemed like a fantastic idea. '273
But the American Society of Reproductive Medicine recommends no
more than six egg donations.
Conceptual Options in San Diego has a special category of "ex-
traordinary donors," which included a, "stunning brunette with a per-
fect smile and an astounding resume. At age twenty-three, she is a
third-year medical student in California. She's five-feet-eight, a Na-
tional Merit Scholar, professional ballerina, competitive equestrian
and award-winning athlete." The broker was selling the eggs for
$50,000. Commodification is so complete that donors feel empowered
rather than exploited (just like the stealth advertisers discussed
above). The tall Norwegian thought it was "neat to be picked .... -"274
A mother who had donated four times, never accepting more than
$2,500, "wanted to be able to help. '275 A Rutgers University profes-
sor-turned-broker, after having two children with donated eggs,
265. See Ron's Angels, supra note 258.
266. Goldberg, supra note 258.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Weiss, supra note 258.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. All Things Considered, Egg Donation and the Free Market (National Public Radio broad-
cast July 28, 2005).
273. Id.
274. Weiss, supra note 258.
275. Id.
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claimed: "I've interviewed 1,100 college girls and they all say, 'My
genes are wonderful, and my eggs should be out there."' 276 Kathy
Stern, of Southwest Surrogacy Arrangements and Parenting Options
in Houston, claims to have "turned young women down that they're
only hoping to gain a check out of it [Sic].' '2 7 7 She asks, "What are you
hoping to gain from this experience, outside of the check that you are
going to receive?" 278 She wants them to say: "providing the means for
someone to have a baby is . . . something I'll feel good about for the
rest of my life."' 279 But another woman who had earned $22,000 for
college through four donations felt "weird" seeing her baby's picture
"because it looked just like me" and did not think she ever wanted to
meet the children. 280
When I raise the problem of assigning a dollar value to pain and
suffering (the next topic), I suggest (facetiously) that we could avoid
the arbitrariness and alleged excesses of jury verdicts by creating a
market in sadism in which dominants paid to inflict pain on submis-
sives (scrupulously excluding SM practitioners who enjoyed one or
both roles). My crude attempt at black humor usually provokes em-
barrassed laughs. But professional sports have long pandered to spec-
tator sadism-not only Roman slaves fed to lions or set to killing each
other in the Coliseum, but also their contemporary equivalents: NAS-
CAR racing; extreme fighting without rules or protective gear; even
conventional boxing, wrestling, and football; and the sale of stories of
suffering and endurance by explorers, mountain climbers, the ship-
wrecked, and so on.
Reality television shows have tried to exploit this commercial terri-
tory.28 1 Fox aired The Chamber twice, hoping to lift its ratings during
the February sweeps.2 82 Contestants were bound to a chair and ex-
posed to either subzero cold or flames that raised the temperature
above 150 degrees Fahrenheit. 283 ABC competed with The Chair,
which remained on air longer although its ratings dropped. 284 Fox
also launched The Glutton Bowl, screening bouts staged by the Inter-
national Federation of Competitive Eating, in which contestants vied
276. Id.
277. All Things Considered, supra note 272.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Weiss, supra note 258.
281. Bill Carter, Fox TV Pulls "The Chamber," A Reality Show, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at
C8.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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to down the most hot dogs, hamburgers, eggs, beef tongue, and butter
in the least time.285
Like the examples above, money damages commodify human expe-
rience in multiple ways. Nineteenth-century courts rejected wrongful
death actions because "[t]o the cultivated and enlightened mind, look-
ing at human life in the light of the Christian religion as sacred, the
idea of compensating its loss in money is revolting. '28 6 As the decline
of child labor transformed twentieth-century children from productive
family assets to consuming liabilities, a court declared: "Awarding pe-
cuniary damages to the next of kin of a child six years of age is merely
making a business commodity out of the child, and subjecting the loss
of that child's life to the dollars and cents argument. '28 7 An unusually
explicit example is the New York Workers' Compensation Law, which
pays two-thirds salary for loss of a member for periods ranging from
fifteen weeks for a fourth finger to 312 weeks for an arm.2 8 It re-
places digits and limbs with money rather than the Tin Woodsman's
metal.
Tort damages for nonpecuniary loss grotesquely elaborate these
crude equivalences. A jury had to decide how much money would
buy just the right amount of pleasure to neutralize Joe Dial's pain. All
markets radically simplify differences among complex wholes by rank-
ing them along a single dimension of desirability, calibrated by
price. 28 9 The market for human eggs revealed (unsurprisingly) that
affluent Americans have been taught to prefer Scandinavian bodies.
(Hitler was discomfited by the fact that the Aryan traits he prized
were more pronounced among the Nordics he conquered than his
German "master race.")
Wrongful life cases that award damages to children have to calcu-
late how much less they are worth than "normal" children. When
Nicholas Perruche's mother was four weeks pregnant, she told her
doctor she might have been exposed to German measles and, if so,
wanted to abort.290 After the doctor and laboratory negligently failed
to diagnose her condition, Nicholas was born deaf, mute, largely blind,
285. Id.
286. Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180 (1867), quoted in ZELIZER, supra note 46, at 141 n.6.
287. Schendel v. Bradford, 140 N.E. 155 (Ohio 1922), quoted in ZELIZER, supra note 46, at 152
n.37.
288. N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 15 (McKinney 1991).
289. See Wendy Espeland & Mitchell Stevens, Commensuration as a Social Process, 24 ANN.
REV. Soc. 313-43 (1998).
290. Marlise Simons, French Uproar Over Right to Death for Unborn, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19,
2001, at A3.
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with a weak heart, and confined to a wheelchair. 291 By the time he
was two his mother suffered a nervous breakdown, divorced, and in-
stitutionalized Nicholas, who spent alternate weekends with each par-
ent.292 A French court's decision granting him and his mother causes
of action touched off a firestorm.293 An advocacy group for the handi-
capped sued the court that had rendered the judgment. 294 The head
of the Alliance for the Right to Life complained: "This sends a mes-
sage to handicapped people that their life is worth less than their
death. '295 The head of the Liberal Democratic Party (a doctor), said
the decision "validates the principle that the birth of a handicapped
child in itself is an abnormality. '296 Indeed, if medical science contin-
ues to make "progress" in its ability to create designer babies, why
should not all children be entitled to be above average (as in Lake
Wobegon)-and recover damages from their parents and doctors if
born anything less?
But it is the relationship cases that make me most queasy. Some
courts deal with the problem of pricing relationships by focusing ex-
clusively on what has market value. One court limited damages for
the death of a child to "the loss of that kind of guidance, advice and
counsel which all of us need from time to time ... that could be pur-
chased from a business adviser, a therapist, or a trained counselor"297-
the antithesis of the parent-child relationship. When judges venture
outside the market they necessarily introduce their cultural biases.
Courts have justified awards for "a romantic husband and caring fa-
ther . . . [an] all-American guy,"2 98 a marriage "of exceptional har-
mony and happiness" and a "life more meaningful than the great
majority of people could anticipate or would experience, ' 299 and a
"devoted husband. '300 But how can a jury know what one partner
feels about the other? What should the jury have considered in deter-
mining Arrah Dial's damages? The court called Joe "an attractive
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. Early wrongful birth cases expressed concern that compensating parents would make
children feel unwanted, though none denied compensation for this reason. Hartke v. McKelway,
707 F.2d 1544, 1552 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Boone v. Bullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 722 (Ala. 1982);
Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 So. 2d 568, 571 (Ark. 1982); McKernan v. Aasheim, 687 P.2d 850, 855 (Wash.
1984).
296. Simons, supra note 290.
297. Green v. Bittner, 424 A.2d 210, 216-17 (N.J. 1980) (emphasis added).
298. Drews v. Gobel Freight Lines, 578 N.E.2d 970, 972-73 (Il. 1991) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
299. Ossenfort v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672, 686 (Minn. 1977).
300. Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 869 (Iowa 1994).
[Vol. 55:253
GENERAL DAMAGES ARE INCOHERENT
man as far as his wife was concerned." 301 My students laugh, espe-
cially the women, sensing a euphemism for: "he's dorky, but I love
him." What about his "emotional IQ? ' 30 2 Or how much time they
spent together and what they did? Should their sex life be calibrated
by the frequency and quality of lovemaking or their precise sexual
behavior? And what about fidelity on both sides? Should the jury
predict the durability of the marriage? If so, what demographic and
other variables are relevant? When courts extend relational damages
to parents and children, how should they value that bond-by how
skilled the child is in the overprogrammed activities of the middle
class family: soccer, martial arts, music, gymnastics, dance, little
league, skiing, computer science? And how should a jury evaluate the
quality of parenting: by how closely it approached how-to manuals? If
so, which ones? Attempts to assign money values to relationships uni-
versalize prostitution, extending throughout a lifetime the temporary
insanity of high school rating dating, where everyone has a precisely
defined place in the popularity pecking order.
The critique of commodification is both deontological and conse-
quentialist. The first argues that we violate our essential humanity by
pricing bodily integrity, emotional well-being, existence and nonexis-
tence, and relationships. The second warns that doing so normalizes
commodification, both perpetuating it and encouraging its extension
to other domains.30 3 The latter predictions could be empirically
tested.
VI. CALCULABILITY
The trier of fact needs a metric in order to calculate damages. The
market provides an adequate one for pecuniaries: lost property, in-
come, and medical expenses. The only problem is extrapolating the
last two into the future and discounting to present value. But there is
no market for human experience, and attempts to commodify it
rightly provoke intense opposition.
Much criticism of general damages has emphasized their unpredict-
ability and apparent arbitrariness. 3°4 One of the most notorious er-
301. Wry v. Dial, 503 P.2d 979, 982 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972).
302. HOWARD GARDNER, MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES: THE THEORY IN PRACrICE (1993).
303. See Radin, supra note 28, at 84; Sunstein, supra note 47, at 817.
304. See W. Kip Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTs LIABILITY (1991); Randall R. Bovbjerg et
al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908
(1989) (presenting a wide variation in valuation of similar injuries; greatest for general damages);
Audrey Chin & Mark A. Peterson, Deep Pockets, Empty Pockets: Who Wins in Cook County
Jury Trials (Rand Corp., Inst. for Civil Justice No. R-3249-ICJ, 1985); Kahneman & Spitzer, Pain
and Suffering in Product Liability Cases: Systematic Compensation or Capricious Awards?, 8
2006]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
rors was Ford's valuation of potential injuries from ruptured Pinto gas
tanks at only $200,000 per victim, which led it to decide on cost-bene-
fit grounds against spending eleven dollars per car to prevent such
ruptures. 305
Vetoing legislation that would have authorized hedonic damages in
Rhode Island, Governor Lincoln Almond called them "intangible,
emotional, and highly subjective. '3 0 6 My torts students award wildly
differing amounts to Joe Dial, from the purely nominal to tens of mil-
lions, in a distribution that is far from normal (see Table C). A com-
parison of damages awarded in a simulated case by lawyers and
laypeople found that the standard deviation was considerably higher
for the latter (although when lay responses were grouped in six and
twelve person "juries" they displayed greater consensus than individ-
ual lawyers). 30 7 But interviews with jurors in actual cases disclosed
that, although they reached a "compromise" verdict, those who began
at the extremes remained dissatisfied with the result.308 In the first
plaintiff's verdict in a Ford Explorer SUV rollover case, a California
jury awarded a paralyzed driver more than four times what she had
sought: $4.6 million specials, $13 million dollars for loss of consortium,
and a staggering $105 million generals. 30 9 Ford objected that "it's not
based on any rationale that we can comprehend. ' 310 Jury awards of
nonpecuniary damages for ten of the passengers who died in the same
Korean Airlines crash varied from nothing to $1.4 million. 311 State
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 203 (1988); McCaffery et al., supra note 33; Frank A. Sloan & Chee R.
Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation Fair?, 24 LAW. & Soc'v
REV. 997, 999 (1990). Others have argued that critics overstate the variation not attributable to
legally cognizable differences. See Corinne Cather et al., Plaintiff Injury and Defendant Repre-
hensibility: Implications for Compensatory and Punitive Damage Awards, 20 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 189 (1996); Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 243 (1997); Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Hedonic Damages: The Rapidly
Bubbling Cauldron, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1037 (2004); Roselle L. Wissler et al., Explaining Pain
and Suffering Awards: The Role of Injury Characteristics and Fault Attributions, 21 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 181 (1997).
305. E.S. Grush & C.S. Saunby, Fatalities Associated with Crash-Induced Fuel Leakages and
Fires, in THE FORD PINTO CASE: A STUDY IN APPLIED ETHIcS, BUSINESS, AND TECHNOLOGY
(Douglas Birsch & John H. Fielder eds., 1994).
306. Press Release, Governor Lincoln Almond, Almond Vetoes Bills Concerning Jury Selec-
tion, Wrongful Death Actions (July 12, 2001), available at http://www.uri.edu/library/special-col-
lections/almond/press/documents/julyl201 c.html.
307. VIDMAR, supra note 134, at 225 & tbl.19.
308. Id.
309. Myron Levin, Jury Orders Ford to Pay $122.6 Million, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 2004, at C1.
310. Id.
311. David Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 256 (1989).
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jury wrongful death awards displayed large variations, with means
ranging from two to more than five times medians. 31 2
Among the twenty-one U.S. Roman Catholic Dioceses that have
entered into global settlements with their many sexual abuse victims,
average awards varied from $22,388 in Cincinnati, Ohio; and $38,260
in Camden, New Jersey; to $423,595 in Bridgeport, Connecticut;
$511,628 in Hartford, Connecticut; $1,060,606 in Sacramento, Califor-
nia; $1.15 million in Orange County, California; $1,177,778 in Santa
Rosa, California; and $1,363,636 in Tucson, Arizona.313 In Covington,
Kentucky, the more than 100 awards varied between $5,000 and
$450,000. 3 1 4 A San Francisco jury, trying the first case in the state
since the legislature lifted the statute of limitations, awarded $437,000,
far more than the $200,000-$365,000 the archdiocese had proposed. 315
The Archdiocese of Louisville retained Matt Garretson, an expert
in evaluating damages, to divide the $25 million settlement among 243
victims. 316 Because he was responsible to the supervising judge, he
created a grid with three categories of abuse-"non-genital sexual
touching," "penis-body contact," and rape-crossed with variables of
frequency of abuse, age, and aggravating circumstances. 31 7 Awards
ranged between $15,000 and $175,000.318 When Garretson was hired
by the Cincinnati Archdiocese to allocate the three million dollars it
offered ex gratia to 132 victims (since Ohio refused to extend the stat-
ute of limitations), he made purely subjective judgments.319 This re-
quired him to put a figure on Marvin Armbuster's experience. In
seventh grade he went to the house of his Catholic junior high school
teacher to pick up newspapers for a Cub Scout drive. 320 The teacher
talked to him, gave him a beer, told him to undress for a nap, and
312. Robert Cooter, Hand Rule Damages for Incompensable Losses, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1097, 1111 (2003).
313. Eric Bailey, Church Settles Priest Abuse Claims, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2005, at BI; Wil-
liam Lobdell & Jean Guccione, Diocese's Deal Raises the Bar Across U.S., L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4,
2004, at Al.
314. William Hardley, Church Settles Abuse Claims in Hartford, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2005, at
B1; P.J. Huffstutter, Diocese Seeks Healing After Sex Abuse Crisis, L.A. TIMES, June 5, 2005, at
A12; P.J. Huffstutter & Larry B. Stammer, Diocese to Pay Largest Abuse Settlement Yet, L.A.
TIMES, June 4, 2005, at A12.
315. Jean Guccione, Church Loses Abuse Case, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2005, at B1.
316. Jean Guccione & Glenn F. Bunting, Talks on Sex Abuse by Priests Restarted, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 6, 2006, at Al; Stephanie Simon, Putting a Price on Pain, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2005, at Al;
Church Offers to Settle More Abuse Claims, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2005, at A16.
317. Simon, supra note 316.
318. Id.
319. Id
320. Id.
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raped him.321 He dropped out of school and later became a heroin
addict.322 He eventually married and had a son and daughter, but "I
didn't hug them or kiss them like I should. I ache when I think of
it. "323
Juries get little guidance from either lawyers or judges. Defense
lawyers often choose not to offer evidence about damages out of a
well-founded fear of alienating jurors.324 An alternate in a medical
malpractice case said that he and the other jurors (who talked after
the verdict) were "angry" that the defense lawyers "had been trying to
put one over on us, claiming that Stephen was a normal teenage boy
with a few minor handicaps. '325 The alternate continued, "For seven
weeks, the jury had sat in that courtroom listening to the defense law-
yers belittle Stephen's problems. We saw the doctors refuse to ac-
knowledge Stephen's handicaps or to accept responsibility for
them." 326
Variation is much greater for general damages than specials. 327 Un-
usual injuries produce greater variation.328 Psychological experiments
that ask individuals to evaluate tort cases find much greater diver-
gence in damage awards than severity estimates, and greater diver-
gence among laypeople than lawyers (both plaintiffs' and defendants')
and judges.329 Should victim characteristics be relevant? Should sto-
ics recover less because they hide their pain or more because they are
less in touch with their feelings? Trial manuals advise plaintiffs' and
defendants' lawyers whom they want on and off their juries (without
offering an empirical foundation). 330 At least some trial lawyers select
321. Id.
322. Simon, supra note 316.
323. Id.
324. VIDMAR, supra note 134, at 197.
325. Id. at 102, 108; Steve Cohen, Malpractice Behind a $26-Million Award to a Boy Injured in
Surgery, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1990, at 23.
326. VIDMAR, supra note 134, at 108.
327. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: Sources of
Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301 (1998). This remains true
even after eliminating extremes and even when "jurors" deliberate collectively.
328. Allen J. Hart et al., Injuries, Prior Beliefs and Damage Awards, 15 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 63
(1997).
329. Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decision-Making About General Damages: A Comparison of
Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751 (1999).
330. ELLIOT BISKIND, How TO PREPARE A CASE FOR TRIAL (1954); NEIL KRESSEL & DORIT
KRESSEL, STACK AND SWAY: THE NEW SCIENCE OF JURY CONSULTING 116-28 (2002); WARD
WAGNER, ART OF ADVOCACY: JURY SELECTION (2004); Solomon M. Fulero & Steven D. Pen-
rod, Attorney Jury Selection Folklore: What Do They Think and How Can Psychologists Help?, 3
FORENSIC REP. 233 (1990); Dennis Harrington & James Dempsey, Psychological Factors in Jury
Selection, 37 TENN. L. REV. 173 (1969); Andrew J. White, Jr., Selecting a Jury, in SUCCESSFUL
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on the basis of demographics. 331 But other studies have found little
difference between the judgments of legal professionals and laype-
ople 332 and higher levels of agreement among jurors, real and simu-
lated, than survey respondents. 333 I know of no research on variation
among trial judges, in either bench trials or ordering remittitur. 334
The lack of a metric is perfectly captured by the legislative mandate to
appellate courts, which are authorized to order a new trial when the
award "deviates materially from what would be reasonable
compensation." 335
None of the proposed solutions is either acceptable or effective. 336
After the Mississippi Supreme Court allowed plaintiffs' "expert wit-
nesses" to testify about loss of enjoyment, 337 defendants' lobbyists
persuaded the state legislature to prohibit such testimony. 338 Most
courts have rejected expert testimony,339 but there is no principled
basis for preferring either approach. Mississippi continues to allow
"character" witnesses to testify about how much a deceased victim
enjoyed life.340 Because there is an adequate metric for pecuniary
damages and greater juror consensus about them, many argue that
generals should be proportional to specials, usually in the range of one
JURY TRIALS: A SYMPOSIUM (John Alan Appleman ed., 1952); see also DAVID BALL, DAVID
BALL ON DAMAGES (2d ed. 2005).
331. JOHN VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES (1977); George Hayden et al.,
Prosecutorial Discretion in Peremptory Challenges: An Empirical Investigation of Formatical Use
in the Massachusetts Jury Selection Process, 13 NEW ENG. L. REV. 768 (1978); Alice Padawer-
Singer & Alan Barton, The Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors' Verdicts, in THE JURY SYSTEM
IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL REVIEW 135 (Rita J. Simon ed., 1975); Eugene D. Tate et al., Commu-
nication Variables in Jury Selection, 24 J. COMM. 130 (1974).
332. Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical
Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883 (1993).
333. Jane Goodman et al., Runaway Verdicts or Reasoned Determinations: Mock Juror Strate-
gies in Awarding Damages, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 85 (1989); Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the
American Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 849 (1998).
334. In Louisiana, appellate courts can order remittitur. See, e.g., Prevost v. Cowan, 431 So.
2d 1063 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
335. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) (McKinney 2003).
336. Joseph Sanders agrees but still feels that some greater effort towards horizontal equity is
desirable. Joseph Sanders, Why Do Proposals Designed to Control Variability in General Dam-
ages (Generally) Fall on Deaf Ears? (And Why This Is Too Bad), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 489 (2006).
337. Choctaw Maid Farms, Inc. v. Hailey, 822 So. 2d 911 (Miss. 2002); Kansas City S. Ry. Co.
v. Johnson, 798 So. 2d 374, 382-83 (Miss. 2001). Dr. Stanley Smith is the leading expert. See
MICHAEL L. BROOKSHIRE & STAN V. SMITH, ECONOMIC/HEDONIC DAMAGES: THE PRACTICE
BOOK FOR PLAINTIFF AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1990).
338. H.B. 19, 3d Extraordinary Sess. (Miss. 2002).
339. For example, federal courts and courts in California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, and West Virginia have rejected expert testimony on such matters.
See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 304 at 1064 n.130.
340. Choctaw Maid Farms, 822 So. 2d at 922.
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or two to one.34' But there is no necessary relationship between them.
Those unsalaried and beyond medical assistance can still suffer ex-
treme pain and loss of enjoyment. I could still teach law as long as I
could read and speak, however physically impaired. Others may lose
jobs while retaining most functions; and expensive medical care may
eventually restore victims to full function. A California jury recently
awarded a woman $7.5 million for the long-term emotional effects of a
train crash, in which she suffered $900,000 in lost wages and $500,000
in medical expenses.342 One jury awarded eight million dollars to a
child, with a seventy-two-year life expectancy, whom malpractice had
rendered retarded, blind, deaf, and unable to use his arms or legs or
sit in a chair without support-that was the uncontested amount of
economic damages. The jury awarded nothing for noneconomic dam-
ages because many felt the economic damages were "huge," "unbe-
lievable," "exorbitant," and "running wild" 34 3 Furthermore, as
discussed below, proportionality extends the profound inequalities
that characterize income, wealth, and access to healthcare to those
domains where we are essentially equal.
One commentator has suggested emulating the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. 344 But those guidelines have rightly provoked great resis-
tance from trial judges, criticism by commentators, and constitutional
challenges, all of which might jeopardize civil guidelines as well.345
All schedules, from the Code of Hammurabi and the Roman Twelve
Tables, to the New York Workers Compensation Law quoted above,
impose slot-machine justice, sacrificing nuance and individualization
to convenience. The Zhejiang (China) Department of Labor and So-
cial Security awards six months pay for loss of one digit, ten months
for two, fourteen months pay plus seventy percent pay to retirement
for four, eighteen months and seventy-five percent for a forearm or
both thumbs, twenty months and eighty percent for an arm or hand
341. As the dissent in Seffert explained, "A review of reported cases involving serious injuries
and large pecuniary losses reveals that ordinarily the part of the verdict attributable to pain and
suffering does not exceed the part attributable to pecuniary losses." Seffert v. Los Angeles
Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 346 (Cal. 1961) (Traynor, J., dissenting). Trial lawyers and insurance
claims adjusters use a similar rule of thumb. See H. LAURENCE Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT
107-11 (1980).
342. Caitlin Liu & Christine Hanley, $9 Million Awarded in Train Crash, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9,
2004, at B1.
343. VIDMAR ET AL., supra note 134, at 239-41.
344. Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 763 (1995); Frederick S. Levin, Pain and Suffering Guidelines: A Cure for Damages Mea-
surement "Anomie," 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 303 (1989).
345. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 524 U.S. 296
(2004).
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and the thumb of the other, and twenty-four months and ninety per-
cent for both arms.346
Malpractice insurers divide injuries into nine categories, ranging
from "emotional only" to death; but this, of course, is just a circular
prediction of jury awards.347 Would anyone find it acceptable to sim-
plify remedies for contract, property, business torts, or divorce this
way?
The fixed and relatively low awards to 9/11 survivors for bereave-
ment (raised from a proposed $50,000 to $100,000) and pain and suf-
fering ($250,000) attracted sharper criticism than any other aspect of
the compensation fund. Plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers were natu-
rally outraged. "You can't get fair damages unless each case is treated
individually," said a New York lawyer.348 A Cleveland lawyer criti-
cized the grid as "a very incomplete and irrational method for evaluat-
ing a family's loss."' 349 And a Chicago lawyer called it an effort "to
sterilize the process that ignores the individuality of each claim. ' 350 A
spokesman for the 9/11 Widows and Victims' Association asked: "Is
the lack of a father for the next 20 years only worth $50,000? I don't
think any parent would accept that price tag. '351 Vincent Ragusa
demonstrated with a photo of his son Michael in his firefighter's uni-
form and the caption: "If my son saved your life on 9/11 how much
would he be worth to you?" 35 2 Sarah Siller displayed a poster of her
husband in his firefighter's uniform with the caption: "He didn't fail
you!! Don't fail his 5 children!!!!" 353
The enormous range of nonpecuniary damages offered by other ter-
rorism compensation schemes dramatically illustrates the lack of any
principled foundation. The United States paid $1.5 million to the fam-
ilies of each of those killed when it mistakenly bombed the Chinese
Embassy in Serbia.354 In 1986, Libyan agents blew up La Belle night-
club in Berlin, killing three and wounding hundreds.355 The Libyan
346. Joseph Kahn, China's Workers Risk Limbs in Export Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2003, at
A3.
347. NAT'L ASS'N. OF INS. COMM'RS., MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: FINAL COMPILATION 10 (M.
Patricia Sowka ed., 1980).
348. William Glaberson, Federal Plan for an Aid Formula Is Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
2001, at B7.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Geraldine Blum, Sept. 11 Fund's Fine Print Angers Many Relatives, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17,
2002, at Al.
352. Id.
353. Geraldine Blum, Relatives Rally to Protest 9/11 Fund, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at A7.
354. Belkin, supra note 54.
355. Libya Will Pay Non-U.S. Victims Of Berlin Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2004, at A6.
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government has agreed to pay the family of the dead Turkish woman
one million dollars, those seriously injured $350,000, and those with
lesser injuries $190,000.356 Lawyers were still negotiating over the two
dead and 169 wounded Americans. 357 Libya agreed to pay $10 million
to the families of each of the 270 passengers killed in the 1998 Pan Am
bombing over Lockerbie. 358 It paid one million dollars to each of the
families of the 170 killed in the bombing of the French UTA jet over
West Africa in 1989. 359 Chile will pay the 27,255 people, whose claims
were recognized by the special government commission on torture
under Pinochet, a lifetime pension of about $200 per month plus spe-
cial benefits or preferential access to education, healthcare, and
housing.360
The United States displays an equally ad hoc response to those it
has killed and wounded in Iraq. Between May 2003 and June 2004,
the military denied 5,700 claims while paying a total of $2.2 million to
5,600 claimants. 361 The Commander's Emergency Response Program
paid out ten times as much as the Foreign Claims Act (which excludes
combat), up to $11,000 per claimant for the former compared with
$2,500 per death for the latter.362 The military offered $10,000 to the
family of Mohammed Ghazi Kaabi, killed while trying to enter the
government office in which he worked. 363 The military gave $5,000 to
Ali Kadem Hashem, who saw his three children killed by an Ameri-
can missile that hit his house and then watched his wife burn to
death.364 The guidelines suggest a thousand dollars per injury and
$2,500 per death.365 Given $6,000 for the death of his brother, sister,
wife, and six children, Said Abbas Ahmed asked: "This war of yours
cost billions. Are we not worth more than a few thousand?" 366 After
the United States destroyed Najaf in August 2004 in order to rid it of
insurgents, the Marines doled out $8.9 million, $300 to $400 for most
property damage claims.367 Although President Bush signed legisla-
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Larry Rohter, Chile: Payment for Torture Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at A6.
361. Charles Duhigg, Where to Draw Line on Paying Damages in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6,
2004, at A9.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Jeffrey Gettleman, For Iraqis in Harm's Way, $5,000 and 'I'm Sorry,' N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
17, 2004, at Al.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Edward Wong, Iraq Holy City Suffers Lack of Utilities and Pilgrims, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
2005, at A10.
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tion sponsored by Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt) authorizing $10 mil-
lion for victims, none has been distributed. 368  A Senate
Appropriations Committee spokesperson said that both the State and
Defense Departments "came to us with concerns about setting a pre-
cedent of compensation for war victims. 369
Others have recommended that jurors receive data on "similar"
awards, like the tables used by German judges.370 But experience is
unique, especially in cases where juries make large awards-precisely
those that provoke the harshest criticism (which may be why courts
have rejected this proposal).371 Furthermore, average general dam-
ages recently grew threefold between 1960-69 and 1980-87, after ad-
justment for inflation. Which awards were correct: the earlier, the
later, or both?372 Ms. Seffert's $134,000 was the largest pain and suf-
fering award in California in 1961. 373 Joe Dial's $2.5 million nonpecu-
niary damages was part of the largest compensatory judgment ever
awarded in the United States in 1971. 374 Three decades later, a jury
awarded forty-eight million dollars in pain and suffering to a forty-six-
year-old worker who had suffered third degree burns over more than
seventy-five percent of his body, lost his marriage, and lived in chronic
pain, unable to care for himself.375 Most states let plaintiffs lawyers
ask juries to subdivide general damages into brief time periods. 376 It
is clearly easier to imagine being Ms. Seffert or Joe Dial for an hour
than a lifetime; but small differences in valuation are greatly magni-
fied when extrapolated over the latter (thirty-five years or 306,600
hours for Ms. Seffert, thirty-nine years or 341,640 hours for Joe
368. Duhigg, supra note 361.
369. Id.
370. James F. Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better Tools for Assessing
Damages for Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 171 (1991); Chase, supra note 344, at 777;
Diamond et al., supra note 327, at 321-22; Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering:
A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 773 (1995); Levin, supra note 344; Anthony Sebok, Should We Care About Fairness in Tort
Damages? An Inquiry into American Exceptionalism, in AMERICAN AND GERMAN LEGAL CUL-
TURES: CONTRAST, CONFLICT, CONVERGENCE 163, 172 (K. Krakau & F. Streng eds., 2003).
371. Miksis v. Howard, 106 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 1997); Richardson v. Champan, 676 N.E.2d 621
(11. 1997).
372. Leebron, supra note 311 (putting the figures at $48,000 in 1960-69 and $147,000 in
1980-87).
373. Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337 (Cal. 1961).
374. The award prompted Dial's lawyer, Richard Grand, to found the Inner Circle of Advo-
cates, honoring lawyers like himself who had won a million-dollar verdict for a single victim. He
later founded the modestly named Richard Grand Society for similarly distinguished British
lawyers-and himself. The Richard Grand Society, http://www.richardgrandsociety.com (last
visited Nov. 27, 2005).
375. Jean Guccione, Burned Worker Wins Huge Verdict, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2004, at B4.
376. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 7, at 293-94.
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Dial). 377 This confirms the intuition that juries award higher damages
when the victim's experience is conceptually subdivided into multiple
categories, such as pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment. 378
Economists have suggested several ways to price experience. Will-
ingness to pay (WTP) asks randomly chosen respondents how much
they would pay ex ante to avoid different consequences. 379 But this
methodology has multiple flaws.380 First, courts explicitly prohibit
plaintiffs' lawyers from asking jurors to consider what they would re-
quire to be paid to change places with the victim. 381 Second, answers
to hypothetical questions about experiences the respondent never
had, or even encountered secondhand, are of dubious value. Indeed,
many respondents refuse to participate for that reason.382 Third, re-
spondents demand much more ex ante than they want ex post.383
Fourth, WTP varies with income and wealth; given huge and rapidly
increasing inequality, this would lead us to conclude that poor people
suffer less pain (just as American hawks claimed that Vietnamese
peasants suffered less when we killed or maimed their loved ones). 384
Not surprisingly, some jurisdictions have rejected WTP.385 Perhaps
the best response is found in the Talmud.38 6 Asked "how do we assess
pain where there is permanent physical damage," the father of Shmuel
377. See Joseph H. King, Jr., Counting Angels and Weighing Anchors: Per Diem Arguments for
Noneconomic Personal Injury Tort Damages, 71 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2003).
378. McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372 (N.Y. 1989); Kalven, supra note 7, at 161-62; Saks
et al., supra note 304.
379. Ted R. Miller, Willingness to Pay Comes of Age: Will the System Survive?, 83 Nw. U. L.
REV. 876 (1989); Erin Ann O'Hara, Note, Hedonic Damages for Wrongful Death: Are
Tortfeasors Getting Away with Murder?, 78 GEO L.J. 1687 (1990).
380. See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 80-81 (2004); PETER DORMAN, MARKETS AND
MORTALITY: ECONOMICS, DANGEROUS WORK, AND THE VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE (1996); John
Broome, Trying to Value a Life, 9 J. PUB. ECON. 91 (1978). For a careful evaluation of the
complexities and ambiguities of discounting future risks, see Richard L. Revesz, Environmental
Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941
(1999).
381. Dunn v. Pennsylvania R.R., 20 Phil. 258 (Ct. C.P. 1890); Jeffrey O'Connell & Keith Car-
penter, Payment for Pain and Suffering Through History, 50 INS. COUNS. J. 411, 415 (1983).
382. THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 1970-1990, EPA REPORT TO CON-
GRESS (1997); see also Judy Clark et al., "I Struggled with This Money Business": Respondents'
Perspectives on Contingent Valuation, 33 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 45 (2000); Daniel Kahneman et al.,
The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 202-03
(1991).
383. McCaffery et al., supra note 33.
384. See generally id.
385. Montalvo v. Lapez, 884 P.2d 345 (Haw. 1994); Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196 (W. Va.
1993).
386. BAVLI TALMUD 85a (2001). Never having been a "cheder" boy, I am grateful to
Jonathan Zaslov for this reference.
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replied: "We assess how much a person wants to take to have his hand
cut off."' 387 But the Gemara objected: "To cut off his hand! It is not
pain alone that is incurred in such a case .... And Furthermore, are
we dealing here with fools?! What sane person would agree to have
his hand cut off?" 388
Economists also use wage risk premiums-amounts equally quali-
fied workers require to be paid for jobs that differ significantly only in
risk. 389 But given the segmented labor market, the riskiest jobs often
pay the lowest wages; it is the most desperate, vulnerable workers-
typically undocumented-who are exposed to pesticides or other toxic
chemicals, unsafe machinery, or hazardous demolition work (as shown
in the Hurricane Katrina clean-up). There are other demographic dif-
ferences. One study found that the wage risk estimate of the value of
a life ranged from $2.6 million for men to $13 million for women and
from $6.1 million for unionized men to $42.3 million for unionized
women. 390 Another found estimates ranging from $900,000 to twenty-
one million dollars.391 Some workers explicitly deny that taking a job
implies acceptance of the risk.392 The wage risk premium may decline
as employment conditions worsen.393 There is some evidence that it
grows with income, rising 1.5-1.7 times faster than inflation.394 Per-
haps for that reason, cost-benefit analysts in the Bush Administration
recently switched from wage risk premiums, which value life at five to
seven million dollars, to willingness to pay, which values it at only $3.7
million.395 Defenders of this change shamelessly claimed that "de-
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Products Liability Cases: Systematic Compensation
or Capricious Awards?, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 203 (1988).
390. John D. Leeth & John Ruser, Compensating Wage Differentials for Fatal and Nonfatal
Injury Risk by Gender and Race (June 2002), quoted in ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note
380, at 79 n.26.
391. RATIONAL RISK POLICY (1998); W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRI-
VATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK (1992); The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1912-46 (1993). For another collection of disparate federal valuations, see Mat-
thew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are
Distorted, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 1105 (2000).
392. Amartya Sen, Plural Utility, 81 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 193, 206 (1982).
393. Ted R. Miller, Variations Between Countries in Values of Statistical Life, 34 J. TRANSPORT
ECON. & POL'Y 169 (May 2000); Janusz R. Mrozek & Laura 0. Taylor, What Determines the
Value of Life? A Meta-Analysis, Aug. 2001, quoted in ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note
380, at 84 n.38.
394. Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, Changes in the Value of Life, 1940-1980, quoted in
ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 380, at 84 n.37.
395. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 380; Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Bal-
ancing Lives Against Lucre: Cost-Benefit Analysis an Exercise in Moral Philosophy, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 2004, at B13.
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bates about risk are often emotionally heated and charged with com-
peting values. Risk analysis adds a cooler, fact-based perspective,
favoring no ideology, no political or corporate agenda." 396
But explicit commodification can provoke backlash. Dr. John Gra-
ham, former head of the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis and now
Bush's regulatory czar, proposed the EPA's Aging Initiative, which
would value the lives of those over seventy at thirty-seven percent less
than younger adults ($2.3 versus $3.7 million). 397 In response to criti-
cism, Graham initially defended the "life-years saved" method by not-
ing that it can also increase the value of the elderly, as the Clear Skies
initiative did for those over sixty-five. 398 But seniors and environmen-
talists demonstrated with big buttons advertising "Senior Discount,
37% Off."'399 A sixty-seven-year-old who attended a public meeting
with his eighty-seven-year-old mother asked: "What family do you
know that would put a price on the life of a grandparent? '40 0 EPA
Director Christie Whitman hastily capitulated: "The life-span one is
fine if you're talking about medical determinations. Does it make
more sense to give scarce lung transplants to someone 75 or someone
17? ... But we don't think that that's as appropriate for the work that
we do."'40 1 An earlier proposal to use the elderly to handle radioac-
tive waste inspired a cartoon of an old couple, with the wife saying to
the husband: "As long as you're going out, why don't you take the
garbage. " 402
Laws-especially judgments-are the reasons the state gives for ex-
ercising power. (Max Weber famously defined authority as power
plus reasons.) 40 3 Law claims to treat like things alike-one of its most
fundamental reasons for existing. But without a metric we cannot say
which experiences are alike or quantify the differences between those
396. James K. Hammitt & Milton C. Weinstein, Balancing Lives Against Lucre: Risk Analysis
is No Soulless Monster of Science, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at B13.
397. Miguel Bustillo, Placing Lower Value on Senior Lives Stirs Anger, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30,
2003, at Bi.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, FINAL REGULA-
TORY SUPPORT DOCUMENT: CONTROL OF EMISSIONS FROM UNREGULATED NONROAD ENGINES
(Sept. 2002); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERAL
BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003 at 421, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb.budget/
fy2003/pdf/spec.pdf.; E.P.A. Drops Age-Based Cost Studies, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2003, at A26.
402. The implication being that because of their advanced age, the couple was more likely to
die from an infirmity other than cancer.
403. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY & SOCIETY (1978).
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that are dissimilar. Under those circumstances, state action is arbi-
trary and unjust, not deserving the title of law.
VII. EQUALITY
Pecuniary damages deliberately reproduce the existing distribution
of income and wealth in pursuit of the status quo ante. Nonpecuniary
damages preserve, create, or aggravate those and other inequalities.
Rejecting liability, Wagon Mound famously pronounced: "All are
agreed that some limitation there must be."'404 (Though many, includ-
ing myself, do not agree.) Judicial skepticism about and hostility to-
wards "pure emotional loss" (and legislative reaction in response to
special interests when judges do extend liability) 405 have led to bright-
line rules articulated in terms of the conclusory concepts of duty and
proximate cause. Courts required impact for more than a century. In-
jury was not the "natural and proximate result" or the "probable or
natural consequences of fright, in the case of a person of ordinary
physical and mental vigor. 40 6 Such claims would create a "flood of
litigation where the injury complained of may be easily feigned with-
out detection, and where the damages must rest upon mere conjecture
and speculation .... 47
Once courts dispensed with impact, they limited recovery to victims
within a narrowly defined "zone of danger. '40 8 A California court de-
clared that "civilized life would not be possible if there were such a
tort" as fear of being struck by a falling airplane.40 9 It mocked the
"loosey-goosey nature of a pure emotional distress claim" because
"psychological symptoms are much more susceptible to being faked
.... 41 In any case, it was "foreseeable that the actual fright itself
will be short lived. 4 1 1 Physics acts on our bodies; we will our emo-
tions and should cultivate a stiff upper-lip (perhaps by growing a
proper British military moustache). Florida courts have been espe-
cially contemptuous of emotional indulgence. In the nineteenth cen-
404. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engin'g Co., [1961] A.C. 338, 423 (P.C.
1961).
405. Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of Torts, 49
DEPAUL L. REV. 533 (1999).
406. Ward v. West Jersey & Seashore R.R. Co., 47 A. 561, 562 (N.J. 1900).
407. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354, 355 (N.Y. 1896).
408. The arbitrariness of these bright lines is not an argument against internalizing the costs of
fear in regulatory risk assessments. See Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis and the Pricing of Fear and Anxiety, 79 CHI.-KErNT" L. REV. 977 (2004).
409. Lawson v. Mgmt. Activities, Inc., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 748 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
410. Id. at 749.
411. Id.
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tury they dismissed emotional distress as "spiritually intangible. '412 A
hundred years later they still maintained that "the requirement of a
physical impact gives courts a guarantee that an injury to the plaintiff
is genuine" and does not "open the floodgates for fictitious or specula-
tive claims. '413 Federal courts have been very cautious in recognizing
emotional distress under the Federal Employer's Liability Act
(FELA) because it is especially "difficult for judges and juries" to
identify valid claims and prevent "unlimited and unpredictable liabil-
ity" and a "flood" of "trivial" claims.414 Three years later the Su-
preme Court rejected the claim of a plaintiff who had no present
symptoms of the disease he feared, imposing a rigid "categorization"
in order "to deny courts the authority to undertake a case-by-case ex-
amination. ' 415 When the Court ultimately allowed such a claim it still
required the fear to be "genuine and serious" and to affect "the plain-
tiff's basic emotional security. '416
Earlier cases requiring "impact" found it in trivial contact,417 as well
as in impact following emotional shock. 418 A court applied the impact
rule to award damages for fear suffered during the instant between a
plane crash and death but not the long minutes of terror while the
plane was falling.419 The New York Court of Appeals initially refused
to recognize a negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED)
action:
[T]here is a limit to attaining essential justice in this area. While it
may seem that there should be a remedy for every wrong, this is an
ideal limited perforce by the realities of this world. Every injury has
ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the waters, without
end. The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of
wrongs to a controllable degree.420
(Of course, the only "reality" that limited this ideal was the court's
own exercise of arbitrary power. And the court was enhancing its
control at the expense of the uncompensated victims.) The court dis-
412. Int'l Ocena Tel. Co. v. Saunders, 14 So. 148 (Fla. 1893).
413. R.J. v. Humana Inc., 652 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 1995).
414. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 557 (1994).
415. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 436 (1997).
416. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 137 (2003).
417. Sawyer v. Dougherty, 144 N.Y.S.2d 746 (N.Y. App. Div. 1955) (blast of air filled with
glass); Powell v. Hudson Valley Ry. Co., 88 N.Y.S. 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 1903) (slight bums);
Buckbee v. Third Ave. R.R. Co., 72 N.Y.S. 217 (N.Y. App. Div. 1901) (slight electric shock);
Jones v. Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co., 48 N.Y.S. 914 (N.Y. App. Div. 1897) ("impact" of in-
candescent bulb).
418. Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231 (1931) (collision inducing fright causing victim to faint
and fall).
419. DeYoung v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 507 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1976).
420. Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 429 (N.Y. 1969).
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paraged the emotional harm of seeing one's child killed or maimed as
simply "the risk of living and bearing children. ' 421 (It was the parents'
risk only because the court declined to make it the tortfeasor's.)
When New York ultimately enlarged the scope of duty, it continued to
draw an arbitrary distinction between victims who fear for themselves
and witness injury to loved ones, and those who suffer only the lat-
ter.42 2 It is impossible to justify the arbitrary distinction between not
compensating the emotional harm of witnessing an injury to a loved
one (arguably among the most painful experiences) and compensating
fear for an injury to oneself that does not transpire.423
The landmark California case creating the NIED action required
contemporaneous perception by a close relative.424 Hence a father
who heard a car hitting someone and ran out of his house to find his
son dead would have no action; but he could invoke nineteenth-cen-
tury precedents to claim damages if he were misinformed his son had
been killed 425 or saw his son's lifeless body negligently dropped.42 6
(Indeed, Service Corporation International of Houston recently paid
$100 million to settle with more than 2,000 Florida families for mis-
handling and removing remains.427) For more than two decades Cali-
fornia granted compensation to plaintiffs if they learned of the
accident within moments428 but not minutes,429 to some430 but not
others431 who reconstructed the accident using senses other than sight,
to a mother who watched her son deteriorate and die in Juvenile Hall
421. Id.
422. Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 1984).
423. Battalla v. New York, 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1961).
424. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
425. Johnson v. State, 334 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1975).
426. Gonzalez v. Metro. Dade County Pub. Health Trust, 651 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1995); Lando v.
State, 39 N.Y.2d 803 (1976); Corrigal v. Ball & Dodd Funeral Home, 577 P.2d 580 (Wash. 1978)
(en banc).
427. Abby Goodnough, Florida: $100 Million Settlement over Remains, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 4,
2003, at A28.
428. Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); Archibald v.
Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
429. Nevels v. Yeager, 152 Cal. App. 3d 162 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (notified by telephone,
mother arrived ten minutes later); Hathaway v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 728 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980); Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Hair v. County of
Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (mother in waiting room); Powers v. Sissoev,
39 Cal. App. 3d 865 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (thirty to sixty minutes); Deboe v. Horn, 16 Cal. App.
3d 221 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (wife summoned to hospital).
430. Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1977) (husband sitting in driver's seat knew that
wife was unloading groceries when car rearended, though he could not see her because trunk lid
was up); Nazaroff, 80 Cal. App. 3d at 554 (mother hearing child's name screamed could recon-
struct that he had fallen into swimming pool out of sight).
431. Hathaway, 112 Cal. App. 3d at 730 (mother could not know from hearing child call "let
go, Michael, let go" that son had been electrocuted); Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d
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over several days but not to the father who heard his wife's nightly
reports but could not visit because of work,432 and to mothers of still-
born children but not to fathers in the delivery room who heard the
fetal heartbeat falter and cease over the monitor.433 One court al-
lowed a mother to recover for witnessing her child become convulsive
and then comatose from an improper intravenous drip, although she
did not know at the time this was negligent; 434 another court, however,
denied recovery to a mother who witnessed her daughter's deteriora-
tion and death from an undiagnosed duodenal ulcer but lacked con-
temporaneous knowledge that this was negligence. 435 California
ultimately adopted rigid rules about relationships and contemporane-
ity 436 and applied them to deny recovery to the adult daughter who
saw her mother "bright blue" in the hospital but did not know at the
time it was because her vein had been negligently nicked during cathe-
terization.437 A California court denied recovery for distress caused
from observing an injury via television,438 and to parents for emo-
tional distress after they administered an excessive dose of medicine
to their child as a result of negligent instructions from the
pharmacist. 439
Massachusetts courts have allowed recovery by a plaintiff who saw
the victim within minutes or hours440 but not the next day.441 Iowa
allowed recovery by a plaintiff mistaken about injury severity,442 but
Massachusetts denied it to a plaintiff mistaken about victim identity
because "daily life is too full of momentary perturbation," and the
plaintiff's distress was "ephemeral. ' ' 443 A Nebraska court agreed with
Massachusetts: "[W]e should shed tears for the loss of [the youth who
actually died], empathize with the grief of his family and friends,
506 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (father following daughters in another car came around curve, saw
wreck and found them dead or dying).
432. Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1985).
433. Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977). Accord Carey v. Lovett, 622 A.2d 1279 (N.J.
1993).
434. Mobaldi v. Bd. of Regents, 55 Cal. App. 3d 573 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
435. Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 31 Cal. App. 3d 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
436. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
437. Bird v. Saenz, 51 P.3d 324, 328-29 (Cal. 2002).
438. Scherr v. Las Vegas Hilton, 168 Cal. App. 3d 908 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
439. Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores, 862 P.2d 148 (Cal. 1993).
440. Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690, 691 (Mass. 1980) (saw victim
paralyzed hours later in hospital); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1296 (Mass. 1978)
(mother died of shock while accompanying injured daughter to hospital in ambulance).
441. Stockdale v. Bird & Son, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Mass. 1987). Cf. Cameron v. Pepin,
610 A.2d 279, 280 (Me. 1992) (plaintiff saw son "shortly" after accident).
442. Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Iowa 1981).
443. Barnes v. Geiger, 446 N.E.2d 78, 81 (Mass. 1983).
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rejoice in Scott Sell's life [the youth thought dead], and move on.."444
Most jurisdictions deny recovery for emotional distress from witness-
ing damage to property,445 although Hawaii has been more expan-
sive.446 Some jurisdictions are more solicitous of pets.447 Although
tortfeasors take victims as they find them physically (the "eggshell" or
"thin skull" plaintiff rule), victims can recover emotional distress only
if an objectively "reasonable" person would suffer it.448 And courts
impose a de minimis requirement on emotional distress (which must
be severe) but not on physical injury. 449
Plaintiffs can recover for witnessing harm to members of their nu-
clear families (whatever the emotional tie) but generally not to any-
one else however strong the bond: neither cohabitants (thereby
excluding gays and lesbians) nor members of the increasingly common
blended families following divorce and death.450 An elevator's sud-
den movement decapitated a man, leaving his body on the landing
while his head-still wearing Walkman earphones-accompanied the
horrified passengers up seven floors. 451 But though the court found
they were in the zone of danger, it denied recovery because they were
unrelated .452
The "zone of danger" test employed by most jurisdictions that rec-
ognize NIED is arbitrary when framed in terms of proximity in space
and time: what does it mean to have been "in danger" if you are not
physically injured? The concept is even less coherent when applied
statistically to populations. A Minnesota court denied emotional dis-
tress damages to patients of an HIV positive gynecologist because
there was "never more than a very remote possibility" of infection. 453
A California court agreed because juries would "reach inconsistent
results" (presumably it was better that judges make arbitrary distinc-
444. Sell v. Mary Lanning Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 498 N.W.2d 522, 526 (Neb. 1993).
445. Roman v. Carroll, 621 P.2d 307 (Ariz. 1980) (dog); Lubner v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 24 (1996) (artwork); Jason v. Parks, 638 N.Y.S.2d 170 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (pet); City
of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1997) (house).
446. Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066 (Haw. 1981); Rodrigues v. State,
472 P.2d 509 (Haw. 1970) (house built by plaintiff).
447. Pet Deaths Trigger Pain, Suffering Suits, NAT'L L.J., July 14, 2003, at 4.
448. Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 22 (N.J. 1997) (plaintiff, who had been pricked by
discarded needle had to show serious and genuine distress "that would be experienced by a
reasonable person of ordinary experience"); see, e.g., Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1980).
449. Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196 (Alaska 1995); Sullivan v. Boston Gas Co., 605 N.E.2d
805 (Mass. 1993) (not "transient symptoms such as vomiting").
450. Pizarro v. 421 Port Associates, 292 A.D.2d 259 (N.Y. 2002).
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 558 (Minn. 1995).
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tions). 454 So did Delaware, in order to forestall claims by those whose
"irrational" fears had been provoked by "the slightest contact. '455
Ohio rejected the claim of a man who had twice within two months
been negligently diagnosed HIV positive because he had not been in
"real and existing physical peril," stating, "[N]ot every wrong is de-
serving of a legal remedy. ' 456 But unless law gives reasons for such
distinctions it becomes mere fiat. Ohio also rejected the claim of a
patient who suffered emotional distress when negligence delayed the
report of test results confirming that his melanoma had not metasta-
sized.457 California required a plaintiff whom the defendant had neg-
ligently exposed to carcinogens to show that his fear was "serious,
genuine and reasonable. '458 (How do you prove an emotion is genu-
ine?) Although New York allowed recovery for fear following x-ray
treatments that burned the plaintiff's arm, 459 Wisconsin denied recov-
ery after a doctor negligently broke a catheter in plaintiff's shoulder,
because liability would place "too unreasonable a burden" on
medicine.460 Although California allowed a husband to recover emo-
tional distress damages from a doctor who negligently told a patient
she had a sexually transmitted disease (and suggested her husband be
tested to see if his infidelity were the cause), 46 1 New York denied
emotional distress damages to the husband of a woman whom a doc-
tor negligently misdiagnosed with cervical cancer.462
The law of relational torts also makes arbitrary distinctions. No
court has recognized a claim for harm caused by physical injury of a
sibling. Yet studies of the siblings of children with autism, cerebral
palsy, and Down syndrome find that they incur heavy emotional bur-
dens, denying their own needs and assuming a quasi-parental role.463
Courts recognize wrongful birth claims by parents but not grandpar-
ents.464 Loss of consortium is recognized between spouses but not co-
habitants465 or parents and children. 466 Yet a recent study found that
454. Kerins v. Hartley, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1062 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
455. Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1361, 1363 (Del. 1995).
456. Heiner v. Moretuzzo, 652 N.E.2d 664, 668-79 (Ohio 1995).
457. Dobran v. Franciscan Med. Ctr., 806 N.E,2d 537 (Ohio 2004).
458. Potter v. Firestone Tire Co., 863 P.2d 795, 800 (Cal. 1993).
459. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1958).
460. Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 383 (Wis. 1974).
461. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813, 817 (Cal. 1980).
462. Christopher v. Kaftal, 433 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
463. Jane Gross, For Siblings of the Autistic, a Burdened Youth, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10. 2004. at
Al.
464. Michelman v. Ehrlich, 709 A.2d 281 (N.J. 1998).
465. Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988). The California Legislature overturned this in
2001. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.01 (West 2002). Other jurisdictions have accomplished this result
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the death of a child sharply increases the likelihood that parents will
suffer mental illness and substance abuse.467 A San Francisco trial
judge recently extended a wrongful death action to the lesbian partner
of a woman bitten to death by a neighbor's two 100-pound presa
canario dogs.468 The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund ex-
tended wrongful death claims to gay and lesbian couples. 469 Kenneth
Feinberg said, "If the next of kin is supportive and there's no dispute,
it's a nonissue. '470 But House Republicans killed a bill to provide
death benefits to the survivors of ten gay public safety officers.
Money inevitably engenders dispute. A 9/11 victim lived with his
gay partner for twenty-six years but never divorced his wife.471 After
his death his kin opposed the partner's claim. 472 Feinberg rejected
claims by those engaged to decedents, which included forty-four of the
more than 600 Cantor Fitzgerald employees killed.473 Susann Brady,
forty-three, was to have married Gavin Cushny, forty-seven, six weeks
later.474 Brady said, "Here you lost the most important person in your
life, and nobody gives you any recognition. You just kind of get by-
passed. ' '475 Rachel Uchitel concurred. 476 Her fianc6, James Andrew
O'Grady, had willed everything to his sister.477 She said:
Money doesn't necessarily compensate, but in this society that's
what we use to compensate. What else is there, unless they're going
without legislation. See generally Graves v. Estabrook, 818 A.2d 1255, 1256 (N.H. 2003);
Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994).
466. Borer v. American Airlines, 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977) (child suing for injury to mother);
accord DeAngelis v. Lutheran Med. Ctr., 449 N.E.2d 406 462 (N.Y. 1983). See also Baxter v.
Superior Court, 563 P.2d 871 (Cal. 1977) (parent suing for injury to child); accord Roberts v.
Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. 2003) (same). But see Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa
1981); Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424 (Mich. 1981) (permitting a severely handicapped child
to recover for injury to parent).
467. Benedict Carey, A Study Ties Loss of a Child to Mental Ills, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2005, at
A14; Jiong Li et al., Hospitalization for Mental Illness Among Parents After the Death of a Child,
352 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1190 (2005).
468. Hang Nguyen, Mauling Victim's Partner Can Sue, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 2001, at B8. The
California Legislature amended the law to codify this result in 2001. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297
(West 2004).
469. See U.S. Fund for Tower Victims Will Aid Some Gay Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2002,
at Al; 9/11 Fund Compensates Lesbian Partner, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2003, at A31.
470. U.S. Fund for Tower Victims Will Aid Some Gay Partners, supra note 469, at Al.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. No Dress, No Vows, and Less Status in Grief, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2002, at Al. Feinberg
describes the struggle with "Solomon's Choices." KENNETH FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH:
THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11, at 151-62 (2005).
474. No Dress, No Vows, and Less Status in Grief, supra note 473.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id.
2006] 309
310 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:253
to give me some knight in shining armor? And in my eyes, that's
never going to happen. I lost the person I loved, and the person
who loved me. 478
This newspaper account provoked a letter to the editor from a woman
who had lost her fiancd in another accident:
I, too, was told: "You're young. you'll find someone else." But
when someone you love dies traumatically, you, too, are trauma-
tized, particularly if the death is compounded by the lack of physical
remains and financial problems stemming from your vague legal sta-
tus. Your life changes forever. Many survivors of disaster never
fully recover. I did not know it at the time, but Earl was the last
man in my life who wanted to marry me, start a family and be my
partner in all ways. Do not assume that because someone is young,
recovery will be automatic. Falling in love with someone is a rare
gift, not like a pair of slippers you can quickly replace if you lose
one. Those who were engaged to the victims of the World Trade
Center not only deserve a full measure of support, but will need it in
the long run. 4 7 9
But the day I wrote about these events, I read the following story in
the New York Times.480 Rachel Uchitel went through a delayed griev-
ing process and then experienced a "massive breakdown" two years
after the attack.48' She said, "I felt like everyone else had forgotten
about it. I was resentful. Lonely. ' 482 She took leave from her job and
began therapy.483 At a 2003 Halloween party she ran into Steven
Ehrenkranz, whom she had known in high school.484 He had inter-
viewed at Cantor Fitzgerald the morning of 9/11 and left just before
the first plane hit; everyone he met there was killed.485 The two got
together again a few weeks later, when both were in Florida.4 86 They
married on November 20, 2004.487 Her maid of honor, who lost her
boyfriend and brother on 9/11, said "It gives the world, and me, so
much hope. '488 This again demonstrates the impossibility of knowing
how tragedy will affect people and therefore the impossibility of put-
ting a dollar value on that impact.
478. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
479. Letter, supra note 473.
480. Gerit Quealy, Rachel Uchitel and Steven Ehrenkranz, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2004, § 9, at
20.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Quealy, supra note 480.
487. Id.
488. Id.
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Another letter writer asked why the Fund did not compensate the
parents who lost sons and daughters, those thousands of silent souls
who wake each morning to know it's not a dream, who feel grief
like a great weight that makes it hard to breathe. They have memo-
ries three and four decades long. It was the parents who nurtured,
taught and encouraged the vibrant young people so poignantly por-
trayed in your pages .... It is the most unnatural thing in the world
for parents to bury their children.489
The previous paragraphs identified tort doctrines that create ine-
qualities by drawing arbitrary bright lines between those who will and
will not receive any damages. Tort law offends egalitarian ideals in
many other ways. The Anglo-Saxon price of homicide, or "wergild,"
varied with the victim's status. 490 Damage awards vary by defendant
(individual versus corporate), case type (automobile versus medical
malpractice), 491 jurisdiction,492 and the gender and household income
of simulated jurors. 493 Special damages reproduce the obscene and
still growing inequalities of wealth and income (in which CEOs make
500 times as much as their workers and accumulate even greater mul-
tiples of wealth). 494 To the extent that judges and juries proportion
generals to specials, they extend these inequalities to experience. 495
That is even more troubling. One could argue that accidental injuries
489. Letter supra note 473.
490. WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY (2001).
491. VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBIL-
rry (2000); MARK A. PETERSON, COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN COOK
COUNTY (1984); David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damage Assessments:
A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms
and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109 (1994-95); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Juries and
Justice: Are Malpractice and Other Injuries Created Equal?, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5
(1991); James K. Hammitt et al., Tort Standards and Jury Decisions, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 751
(1985); Valerie P. Hans & M. David Ermann, Responses to Corporate Versus Individual Wrong-
doing, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151 (1989); Neil Vidmar et al., Damage Awards and Jurors'
Responsibility Ascriptions in Medical Versus Automobile Negligence Cases, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
149 (1994). But see VIDMAR, supra note 134; Jane Goodman et al., Runaway Verdicts or Rea-
soned Determinations: Mock Juror Strategies in Awarding Damages, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 285
(1989); Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain
and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217 (1993); Neil Vidmar, Making In-
ferences About Jury Behavior From Jury Verdict Statistics: Cautions About the Lorelei's Lied, 18
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 599 (1994).
492. STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM
(1995); PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC POL-
ICY (1985).
493. Jane Goodman et al., Money, Sex and Death: Gender Bias in Wrongful Death Damage
Awards, 25 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 263 (1991); Wissler et al., supra note 329.
494. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
495. The limited empirical data suggest that juries reproduce the economic inequalities associ-
ated with race and gender in their verdicts, though these data do not adequately distinguish
pecuniary from nonpecuniary damages. EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, DETERMINING
DAMAGES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY AWARDS 54-58 (2003).
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are an inappropriate occasion to question the distribution of wealth
and income; victims should be restored to the status quo ante, and any
redistribution should be universal and use other mechanisms. (I am
unpersuaded: the real question is whether state power should preserve
inequality.) But in any case there is no justification for extrapolating
material differences to the realm of experience. We all resonate to
Shylock's cri de coeur: "If you prick us, do we not bleed? '496 Injury,
disease, and death are central to the human condition. Even econo-
mists agree on the impossibility of interpersonal comparisons of util-
ity. This may justify Kenneth Feinberg's decision to award the same
amounts for bereavement and the deceased's pain and suffering (al-
though he varied pain and suffering awards for injured survivors). 497
But I believe victim characteristics interact with jury composition to
influence general damages. 498  Certainly, plaintiffs' personal injury
lawyers play such hunches in deciding which cases to take and how to
dramatize them. Manuals urge lawyers to show a deceased child
"playing baseball, riding a merry-go-round, building sand castles at
the beach, or seated on the floor in front of the Christmas tree rapidly
solving a child's puzzle. '499 And claims adjusters have their own algo-
rithms for settling cases, offering more "if the guy coaches Little
League" and has got "two little girls," especially if "they're cute. ' '500
His wife should be pretty but not "gorgeous" because "the jury goes,
'Wait a minute, wait a minute ... she's probably a bitch. ' ' 50 1 "Out-
doorsy" people are worth more than homebodies: "People go, 'He
rock climbed ... this guy enjoyed life."502 "If a mother said her son
visited every week, that was worth a few hundred thousand. For
spouses willing to testify, the loss of good, frequent sex could add
$250,000 or more to a claim. ' 50 3 In a wrongful death case compensat-
ing parents for the grief of losing a child, the court said "it depends on
all the circumstances important in the lives of a particular parent and a
496. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 3, sc. 1.
497. LLOYD DIXON & RACHEL KAGANOFF STERN, COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES FROM THE 9/
11 ATTACKS (2004).
498. Mock jury research suggests that demographic variables have at least a weak effect.
Goodman et al., supra note 493, at 263; Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects
of Plaintiffs Request and Plaintiff's Identity on Punitive Damage Awards, 23 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 445 (1999); Stuart Nagel & Lenore Weitzman, Sex and the Unbiased Jury, 56 JUDICA-
TURE 108 (1972); Eloise C. Snyder, Sex Role Differential and Juror Decisions, 55 Soc. & Soc.
RES. 442 (1970); Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decision-Making About General Damages: A Compar-
ison of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751 (1999).
499. ZELIZER, supra note 46, at 159 n.52.
500. Davidson, supra note 42.
501. Id.
502. Id.
503. Id.
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particular child ... the ability of the child to offer companionship and
society and the ability of the parent to enjoy it."'504 A jury awarded
$480,000 to each of three children (fifteen, twelve, and eight) for loss
of their mother's advice, companionship, moral training, and educa-
tion (was it equally important to each?) but $890,000 to her widowed
husband. 50 5 What could possibly justify those numbers?
Many of my students award Joe Dial tens of millions of dollars be-
cause he resembles them: in graduate school, a striving professional,
highly intelligent, taking pleasure in using his mind, happily married, a
new father, physically fit, with a passion for sports and outdoor activi-
ties. Those characteristics also persuaded them that Arrah Dial loved
him. What if Dial performed menial work, was unattractive, unedu-
cated, a klutz, a couch potato? (Juries award higher damages to ath-
letes than to those who read or watch television.)50 6 Antisocial (even
more than the stereotypical geeky engineer), single, or gay? Should
those with greater genetic and cultural endowments receive higher
damages because they lose more? (Quality Adjusted Life Years, pio-
neered by Oregon to ration healthcare, valued the lives of the dis-
abled less; that was one of the many reasons for its quick
repudiation.) 50 7 Or should those with lesser endowments receive
more because they sink further below the average?
Decisionmakers inevitably introduce their own values in monetizing
losses. Arguing that loss of enjoyment ought to be a category of
noneconomic damages distinct from pain and suffering, New York
Court of Appeals Judge Titone declared, "The capacity to enjoy life-
by watching one's children grow, participating in recreational activi-
ties, and drinking in the many other pleasures that life has to offer-is
unquestionably an attribute of an ordinary healthy individual. ' 50 8 The
Mississippi Supreme Court singled out "going on a first date, reading,
debating politics, the sense of taste, recreational activities, and family
activities. ' 509 A Louisiana Court of Appeals cited "the simple enjoy-
ments of a father with a young child." 510 The Ohio Supreme Court
offered a different list: "loss of ability to play golf, dance, bowl, play
504. Pagitt v. Keokuk, 206 N.W.2d 700, 703-04 (Iowa 1973), quoted in ZELiZER, supra note
46, at 158-59 (emphasis added).
505. Sander v. The Geib, Elston, Frost, Prof'l Ass'n, 506 N.W.2d 107 (S.D. 1993).
506. Davidson, supra note 42.
507. ERIK NORD, COST-VALUE ANALYSIS IN HEALTH CARE: MAKING SENSE OUT OF QALYs
(1999); David P. Hamilton & Virginia Morell, Oregon Puts Bold Health Plan on Ice, 149 Sci. 468
(1990); Jonathan Oberlander et al., Rationing Medical Care: Rhetoric and Reality in the Oregon
Health Plan, 164 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 1586 (2001).
508. McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 377 (1989) (Titone, J., dissenting).
509. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 798 So. 2d 374, 381 (Miss. 2001).
510. Matos v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co., 808 So. 2d 841 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
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musical instruments, engage in specific outdoor sports. '511 Robert A.
Clifford, whose generosity funded this Symposium, recently negoti-
ated a thirty-five million dollar settlement on behalf of a severely in-
jured internationally acclaimed violinist; should that combination of
talent and practice influence her nonpecuniary damages? 512 All of
these examples assume middle-class heterosexuality. The dissent in
the Mississippi case wondered whether defendants would, "be entitled
to put on evidence that the decedent's life was worth very little-be-
cause he was a habitual criminal or a drug user, a member of some
disfavored social, political or religious group, or physically or mentally
handicapped, or just unhappy?" 513
What facts should a jury hear? Affirming nine million dollars in
general damages, a court described the plaintiff as forty-nine years-
old, married for twenty-eight years, with a daughter and grandchild, a
part-time teacher of anthropology at a community college, executive
director of the local museum, who traveled extensively as president of
the Midwest museum conference, had been named businesswoman of
the year and YWCA woman of the year, and enjoyed sailing and read-
ing.514 In another case the court noted that the plaintiff was an ac-
complished amateur violinist. 515 Should she get more than a tone-
deaf karaoke singer? A drummer with no sense of rhythm who
played with a rock group in his garage? Someone who listens to radio
indiscriminately?
An informed consent case turned on whether the doctor should
have warned the patient that extracting a wisdom tooth carried a 1/
100,000 chance of loss of sensation in a half inch square below the
lower lip.5 1 6 Should a French horn player get higher damages? An
amateur ornithologist who attracts birds by whistling? Courts have
given women more money for facial injuries than men.517 Should they
reinforce gender stereotypes? Should Maria Hanson get more for her
slashed face because her beauty made her popular?518 What about
racial stereotypes? Should whites get more for disfigurement because
their appearance is valued by a larger proportion of the population?
511. Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prods. Co., 597 N.E.2d 474, 486 (Ohio 1992).
512. See Summation Legal Technologies, Testimonials, http://www.summation.com/profiles/
profile.asp?ID=2 (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).
513. Choctaw Maid Farms, Inc. v. Hailey, 822 So. 2d 911, 934 (Miss. 2002).
514. Epping v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 734 N.E.2d 916 (Il. App. Ct. 2000).
515. Riddle v. Mem'l Hosp., 349 N.Y.S.2d 855 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973).
516. Henderson v. Milobsky, 595 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
517. Nikkari v. Jackson, 32 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. 1948); Greer v. Palmer, 55 Pa. D. & C. 109
(1946).
518. See discussion of Hanson case, supra notes 196-98.
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And Scandinavians more than other whites? If juries actually display
such biases, does that violate the Fourteenth Amendment?
Unequal damage awards have four questionable consequences.
First, they preserve (and may even aggravate) antecedent inequalities
of wealth and income. Second, they constitute an official state impri-
matur of those inequalities. Third, they violate corrective justice prin-
ciples by making liability vary enormously with consequences rather
than conduct. And finally, they reinforce the economic incentive to
expose poorer people to greater risk. These inequalities become un-
acceptable when made explicit. When the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change's 1995 report valued the loss of lives at $1,500,000
in rich countries, $300,000 in middle-income countries, and $100,000 in
poor countries, the resulting furor forced a revaluation of all lives at
$1,000,000 in the 2001 report.519
VII. LIMITING GENERALS
Many responses to injury display greater solicitude for pecuniary
than nonpecuniary damages. In the mid-nineteenth century, Chief
Baron Pollock (of the Court of the Exchequer) declared that as a bar-
rister he had never claimed "compensation for bodily suffering" and
thought it "an unmanly thing to make such a claim. Such injuries are
part of the ills of life, of which every man ought to take his share. '520
Britain's standardized pain and suffering payments have not kept pace
with cost of living increases since 1960.521 But though the Law Com-
mission recommended across the board increases and doubling in the
most serious cases, the Court of Appeal decreed an increase of just
one-third.522  Canada effectively capped general damages at
Can$100,000 in 1978.523 Every campaign to limit medical malpractice
liability has sought ceilings on general damages. 524 California notori-
ously capped them at $250,000 in 1975 and made no adjustment for
inflation in the following thirty years (during which inflation reduced
519. Compare CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 196-97 (James P. Bruce et al. eds., 1995), with CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: MITIGATION
§ 7.4.4.2 (Bert Metz et al. eds., 2001), and SAMUEL FANKHAUSER, VALUING CLIMATE CHANGE:
THE ECONOMICS OF THE GREENHOUSE 47-48 (1995).
520. Theobald v. Ry. Passengers' Assurance Co., 26 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 438 (1854).
521. The Times (London), Mar. 24, 2000, at 6 (from £80,000-195,000, £110,000-138,000, and
£135,0004175,000).
522. Id.
523. Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., (1978) S.C.R. 229.
524. ABA REPORT OF THE ACTION COMMISSION TO IMPROVE THE TORT SYSTEM (1987); WIL-
LIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LrrI-
GATION CRISIS (2004); Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races": The 1980s Tort Crisis
and the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REV. 207 (1990).
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the cap to $71,000 in 1975 dollars). Opposing any increase, the Cali-
fornia Medical Association president warned that "if malpractice rates
continue to go up, doctors will not want to take high-risk patients.
There's the trade-off. Do you have access to doctors in an emergency,
or do you have access to lawyers in the rare event that something goes
wrong?" 525 Other states have followed California's lead.526 The Med-
ical Society of New Jersey president declared that "these huge jackpot
awards, these $20 million and $9 million awards that [are] breaking
the bank, that [are] depleting the insurance companies of funds they
don't have," are "sacrificing the health care of millions of people in
New Jersey. ' 52 7 Plaintiff compensation funds-state malpractice in-
surance-cap noneconomic damages in four states.528 Some states
have capped general damages for all torts. 529 The 1979 Model Uni-
form Product Liability Act proposed to cap them at the lesser of twice
pecuniaries or $25,000 unless the harm was serious and prolonged.530
States have preserved joint and several liability for special damages
while making liability for general damages only several. 531 California
punishes uninsured motorists and drunk drivers by denying them gen-
eral damages when they are injured.532
President Bush responded to Democratic proposals to amend ER-
ISA to allow patients to sue HMOs for denial of service by proposing
first to cap generals at $500,000 and eliminate punitive damages, and
then to cap both at a total of $1.5 million. 533 He strongly supported
federal caps on general damages for medical malpractice (including
insurers, pharmaceutical companies, and medical device manufactur-
525. Lisa Girion, Justice Denied, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2004, at Cl.
526. Colorado ($250,000), Massachusetts ($500,000), Michigan ($280,000, sometimes in-
creased to $500,000), Missouri ($350,000 with a COLA), Montana ($250,000), Utah ($400,000,
with a COLA), West Virginia ($250,000), and Wisconsin ($350,000, with a COLA). Schwartz &
Silverman, supra note 304, at 1052 n.66.
527. John J. Goldman, N.J. Doctors Stage Walkout, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2003, at A10; Walkout
by NJ Doctors Illuminates a Battle Between Specialists and Insurers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2003, at
A25.
528. Frank A. Sloan et al., Public Medical Malpractice Insurance: An Analysis of State-Oper-
ated Patient Compensation Funds, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 247, 258 (2005).
529. Ken Ellingwood, Mississippi Curbs Big Jury Awards, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2002, at Al;
Ariel Hart, Mississippi: Measure to Limit Damage Awards Advances, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2004,
at All; Ariel Hart, Mississippi: Limit On Tort Damages Begins Sept. 1, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
2004, at A24. Others states have imposed caps: Hawaii ($375,000), Idaho ($250,000 with a
COLA), Maryland ($500,000). Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 304, at 1052 n.66.
530. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 118 (1979).
531. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § E 18 (2000) (ac-
knowledging California Proposition 51 as Track E).
532. Proposition 213 was passed by voters in 1996 and codified in CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 3333.3-3333.4 (West 1997).
533. Greg Miller, Bush Achieves Patients' Bill Compromise, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2001, at Al.
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ers), asserting in one 2004 campaign speech: "Excessive jury awards
will continue to drive up insurance costs, will put good doctors out of
business or run them out of your community, and will hurt communi-
ties like Scranton, Pa."' 534 The chairman of a doctors mutual insurer
complained: "One jury might award $250,000 for an injury; for the
next jury it might be $250 million. ' 535 Representative Billy Tauzin (R-
La), who had been in charge of the bill in the House, said the Presi-
dent had urged Representatives "to consider the importance of for the
nation's good [sic]. This was a national thing that he was very invested
in personally. ' 536 Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary of Health and
Human Services, claimed that a study had found that "the main factor
causing the crisis is the rise in mega-awards and settlements. '537 Dur-
ing a rare press conference soon after the 2004 election, Bush included
the issue in the short list of topics he intended to address in his second
term.
Respected academics like Paul Weiler 538 and George Priest 539 exag-
gerate the proportion of tort damages represented by nonpecuniaries,
estimating them at nearly half. (Minor injuries probably are overcom-
pensated, but they do not produce the large verdicts that outrage crit-
ics; in serious cases, verdicts do not even pay victims' economic losses:
just fifty-seven percent in birth injuries and eighty percent in emer-
gency room injuries.) 540
Each time the law has significantly extended liability (typically by
disregarding fault) it has contracted damages (typically by reducing or
eliminating generals). 541 Workers compensation schemes award much
less than traditional tort laws (usually a function of the member lost-
a crude estimate of diminished earning power and an even cruder esti-
mate of nonpecuniary damage). 542 These awards provide nothing for
injuries that do not impair the worker's labor power, such as dimin-
534. James Gerstenzang, Bush Calls for Curbs on Medical Malpractice Suits, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
17, 2003, at A14.
535. Id. Richard W. Stevenson, President Asks Congress for Measures Against Frivolous Suits,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 17, 2003, at A24.
536. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Lobbyists on Both Sides Duel in the Medical Malpractice Debate,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2003, at A9; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, House Backs Limit on Malpractice
Awards, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2003, at A23.
537. Joseph B. Treaster, Malpractice Insurance: No Clear or Easy Answers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
5, 2003, at Cl.
538. See generally PAUL WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 48 (1991).
539. George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521,
1554 (1987).
540. FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 191-96 (1993).
541. See Matthew Diller, Tort and Social Welfare Principles in the Victim Compensation Fund,
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 719 (2003).
542. Id. at 736.
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ished faculties of taste and smell, sexual and reproductive capacity,
and relationships (thereby privileging the exchange value of labor
power over use values). These inadequacies encourage workers to
avoid workers compensation in favor of tort remedies. The federal
program to compensate miners for black lung pays an arbitrarily de-
termined partial wage replacement but no pain and suffering.543 No-
fault automobile insurance reduced entitlement to general dam-
ages. 544 Proposals to extend no-fault to medical malpractice typically
exclude general damages. 545 A no-fault compensation scheme for
birth-related injuries, enacted in Florida and Virginia, excluded non-
pecuniary damages.546 Proposals encouraging defendants to make
early settlement offers deny nonpecuniary damages to plaintiffs who
accept them. 547
Responses to catastrophes (both natural and man-made) typically
exclude general damages. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency is an example. The Price-Anderson Act allowed full tort
damages for nuclear accidents (though it has never been invoked);548
but a proposal to extend the Act to commercial aviation victims would
have eliminated most pain and suffering.549 The much older Warsaw
Convention on international air travel has a very low cap on total
damages (now $75,000)550 and excludes pure emotional distress. 551
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 limits general
damages to $250,000 (but lets plaintiffs opt into tort).552 In the first
two decades, total awards averaged $824,000. As I write there is a
543. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. § 922 (2000).
544. See, e.g., Robert E. Keeton & Jeffrey O'Connell, Basic Protection Automobile Insurance,
1967 U. ILL. L.F. 400 (Massachusetts prototype); see also N.Y. INS. LAW § 51 (McKinney 1995);
Quebec Automobile No-Fault System: A Whole Different World Next Door, 7 CROSSROADS (Apr.
1998).
545. Havighurst C.C., & Tancredi L.R., "Medical Adversity Insurance"-A No-Fault Ap-
proach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 51 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 125
(1974); Clark C. Havighurst, "Medical Adversity Insurance"-Has Its Time Come?, 25 DUKE L.J.
1233 (1975).
546. Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-
5000-5021 (2002).
547. JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE BLAME GAME: INJURIES, INSURANCE AND INJUSTICE (1986);
Jeffrey O'Connell, A 'Neo No Fault' Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guarantees of Postacci-
dent Settlement Offers, 73 CAL. L. REV. 898 (1985).
548. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1988).
549. William F. Kennedy, Accidents in Commercial Air Transportation-A Proposed Reform
of the Liability and Compensation System. 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 247 (1975).
550. See Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934).
551. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
552. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aal-33 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990).
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proposal to increase the cap on generals to $350,000.553 The federal
Superfund pays no pain and suffering (but allows victims to opt for
tort).554
The post-9/11 federal program to vaccinate against smallpox in re-
sponse to the threat of biological terrorism included a provision to
compensate those injured by the vaccination but only for lost wages,
up to a maximum of $262,100 (the ceiling on federal government pay-
ments to police and firefighters). 555 The September 11th Victim Com-
pensation Fund awarded a fixed $100,000 to each spouse and child of
a decedent and $250,000 for the decedent's pain and suffering (though
it individualized pain and suffering for physically injured survivors).556
Democrats wanted to individualize pain and suffering for everyone.
Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-NY) agreed "it is expensive. But
how do you put a price tag on a life?" (I taught her torts; did I fail-
or succeed all too well?) 557 But three powerful Republicans
squelched this in a meeting in the office of House Speaker J. Dennis
Hastert on the night of September 20, 2001.558
We respond much less generously to wartime fatalities: families re-
ceive the proceeds of a $250,000 life insurance policy (whose premium
is heavily subsidized) and surviving spouses receive at least $10,000
per year.559 The military death gratuity-six months' pay when it was
established in 1908-was raised to $1,800-$3,000 (depending on rank)
in 1956, then to $6,000 (tax free) until 1991 (the first Persian Gulf
War), $12,000 in 2003 (with a COLA), and then $100,000 retroactive
to the invasion of Afghanistan. 560 Expressing both patriotism and
553. Myron Levin, Vaccine Injury Claims Face Grueling Fight, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2004, at
Al.
554. A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 301(E) OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980, S. COMM. ON ENV'T
& PUB. WORKS, 97th Cong. (Serial No. 97-12 1982).
555. Vicki Kemper, House Defeats Compensation Plan for Smallpox Vaccinations, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 2003, at A22; Vicki Kemper, Plan Compensates Health Workers Hurt by Smallpox Vac-
cine, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2003, at A20 [hereinafter Kemper, Plan Compensates]; Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, Congress Acts to Compensate Victims of Smallpox Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2003,
at A7.
556. Kemper, Plan Compensates Health, supra note 555.
557. Hillary Rodham Clinton graduated from Yale Law School in 1973.
558. Diana B. Henriques & David Burstow, Fund for Victims' Families Already Proves Sore
Point, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at Al (Sen. Don Nickles of Oklahoma, Rep. Tom DeLay of
Texas, and Rep. Roy Blunt of Missouri).
559. William Gluberson, Federal Plan for an Aid Formula Is Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
2001, at B7. Dependency and Indemnity Compensation is paid to surviving spouses (a minimum
of $967 per month) and dependent children.
560. James Barron, For Families of Fallen Soldiers, the 2nd Knock Brings $12,000, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 2005, at Al; Increased Military Death Benefit Takes Effect, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at
A23.
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guilt, the Pentagon recently proposed to increase the $100,000 gratuity
and life insurance to $400,000 (with no increase in premium) for those
who die in a designated combat zone.561
The single most comprehensive no-fault scheme, New Zealand's
Accident Compensation Act 1974, eliminated general damages, offer-
ing only a nominal solatium payment (NZ$17,000 for loss of a mem-
ber and NZ$10,000 for other losses).5 62 Academic proposals for
comprehensive no-fault compensation eliminate general damages. 563
Social Security Disability pays no general damages. 564 The 1942 Bev-
eridge Report, which laid the foundation of the British welfare state,
advocated only medical care and a guaranteed income. 565
I ask my law students to consider the following. If the United
States were to adopt a social insurance scheme-perhaps some vari-
ants of Nixon's negative income tax and Clinton's healthcare plan-
should it pay general damages to those who were not tort victims, who
suffer from genetic disabilities, illness, or natural catastrophes? I ask
the minority who favor general damages: should we then make conso-
lation payments to everyone who falls below the median along some
dimension (which of course means everyone)? And what does "be-
low" mean? Is it a hardship to be too short, too tall, too fat? Can one
be too thin? If we opted for such payments, should we fund them by
taxing those above the median (a graduated human endowment tax)?
And what would "above" mean? I ask the majority who oppose pay-
ments to those who were not tort victims if the scheme itself should
pay generals to tort victims (and perhaps be subrogated to the tort
claim)? Most students find social insurance payments for nonpecu-
niary damages hard to justify, although they generally favor some rec-
ognition of the injury and the fact that it could and should have been
avoided. One reason for their reluctance is the recognition that they
will be paying these additional amounts through taxes. (Of course,
that is an even stronger objection to saddling the smaller private liabil-
561. Eric Schmitt, Bush Seeks $81.9 Billion More, Mostly for Forces in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
15, 2005, at A8; Esther Schrader, Broader Survivor Payouts Sought, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2005, at
A6; Scott Shane, Senate Panel On Benefits for Survivors Hears Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2005,
at All.
562. G. W. R. PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY: A STUDY OF LAW AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA (1979); Stephen Todd, Privatization of Accident
Compensation: Policy and Politics in New Zealand, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 404 (2000).
563. P. S. ATIYAH, THE DAMAGES LOTTERY (1997); TERENCE G. ISON, THE FORENSIC LOT-
TERY (1967); STEPHEN SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW (1989).
564. Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort
Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury?, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75
(1993).
565. SIR WILLIAM BEVERIDGE, SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ALLIED SERVICES (1942).
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ity insurance premium pools with general damages-precisely the ar-
gument defendants and insurers have made in their campaign for
caps). I also ask if we care how such payments are spent: are they
more like medical care (delivered in kind under professional control)
or discretionary income (so that individuals have unique insights into
their preferences)? Should the money be used to transcend the in-
jury? Or to buy pleasures that somehow cancel the pain? And if the
victim quickly blows a lump sum payment of general damages (gam-
bling, unwise investments, or luxury purchases), should we replace it?
Just as I elicit these widely shared reservations about social insur-
ance paying general damages in order to stimulate critical thinking
about whether they should remain part of the private law remedy, so I
ask similar questions about private loss insurance. If both tort law and
social insurance excluded general damages, would the students pay
premiums now to recover insurance payments for general damages if
injured? I note that workers do not, even though workers compensa-
tion pays virtually no general damages. And people rarely buy loss
insurance for general damages to cover themselves in situations where
there is no solvent tortfeasor (uninsured motorist coverage being the
exception). Life insurance does not pay for grief nor property insur-
ance for the heartbreak of losing a lifetime of possessions. Indeed,
both rarely cover the full material loss. Disability insurance replaces
lost income, not the joy of work, much less leisure activities. Others
have made similar arguments. 566 Croley and Hanson have advanced a
powerful argument that failures in the private loss insurance market
make it risky to draw inferences from consumer decisions.5 67 But if
consumer (and voter) preferences are not conclusive evidence against
general damages, they certainly do not argue strongly for it.
VIII. ARGUMENTS FOR GENERAL DAMAGES
Proponents of general damages make a number of arguments. In
response to criticisms of incommensurability and commodification,
they reply that we live in a capitalist market economy that puts a price
on everything, even human experience. It would be quixotic to single
566. Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Mar-
kets, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 517 (1984); David Friedman, What Is "Fair Compensation" for Death or
Injury?, 2 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 81 (1982); Daniel A. Graham & Ellen R. Peirce, Contingent
Damages for Products Liability, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 441 (1984); Priest, supra note 539; Alan
Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353
(1988). Margaret Radin argues explicitly that there may be no such insurance precisely because
potential purchasers "reject the symbolism of the transaction." Radin, supra note 28, at 84.
567. Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis?, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 57-67
(1991).
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out the nonpecuniary consequences of injury for different treatment
or to believe that by doing so we would strike a significant blow
against market hegemony. In response to problems of calculability,
defenders of nonpecuniary damages propose incremental reforms:
schedules, tables, criteria. They could also point to recent medical re-
search demonstrating that pain affects the brain's cognitive capacity
and emotional responses 568 and accelerates aging, 569 and that mater-
nal stress and depression affect the fetal heart rate570 and neonatal
nursing behavior. 57' (These findings give new meaning to Holmes's
contention that "the state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the
state of his digestion.") 572 In response to the criticism that general
damages reproduce inequality, proponents reply that leaving the ran-
dom tort victim inadequately compensated would do little to promote
equality. Furthermore, egalitarians have argued that it is the disad-
vantaged-women, children, the elderly, people of color, immi-
grants-who have the lowest special damages and thus stand to
benefit most from general damages (proportionately, if not
absolutely). 573
Proponents make other arguments as well. General damages are es-
sential to pay contingent fees, ranging from twenty-five to fifty per-
cent, in order to ensure that victims are reimbursed for at least their
568. S. Sandberg et al., Asthma Exacerbations in Children Immediately Following Stressful
Life Events: A Cox's Hierarchical Regression, 59 THORAX 1046 (2004); A. Vania Apkarian et al.,
Chronic Back Pain Is Associated with Decreased Profrontal and Thalmic Gray Matter Density, 24
J. NEUROSCI. 10410 (2004).
569. Benedict Carey, Too Much Stress May Give Genes Gray Hair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004,
at D5; Elissa S. Epel et al., Accelerated Telomere Shortening in Response to Life Stress, 101
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES 17312 (2004).
570. Catherine Monk et al., The Effects of Women's Stress-Elicited Physiological Activity and
Chronic Anxiety on Fetal Heart Rate, 24 J. DEV. & BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 32 (2003); Catherine
Monk et al., Fetal Heart Rate Reactivity Differs by Women's Psychiatric Status: An Early Marker
for Developmental Risk?, J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY (2004); Laurie
Tarkan, Tracking Stress and Depression Back to the Womb, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2004, at D5.
571. Maria Hernandez-Reif et al., Differential Sucking by Neonates of Depressed Versus Non-
Depressed Mothers, 10 J. INFANT BEHAV. 1016 (2004).
572. Edgington v. Fitzmuurice, 29 Ch.D. 459, 483 (1885).
573. THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 114 (2001);
Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reform for Women, 64 TENN. L.
REV. 847 (1997); Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and
the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263 (2004). But another study found no evidence that women and
the elderly are more heavily burdened by caps. David M. Studdert et al., Are Damages Caps
Regressive? A Study of Malpractice Jury Verdicts in California, 23 HEALTH AFF. 54 (2004). The
Wisconsin Supreme Court recently found the state cap on noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice cases unconstitutional in part because it disproportionately affected children like the
seven-year-old plaintiff. Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 491
(Wis. 2005).
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out-of-pocket losses.574 General damages are necessary to make cases
profitable to plaintiffs' lawyers, especially where liability is uncertain,
the defendant intransigent, and specials low. That is certainly the trial
lawyers' argument against MICRA and other damage caps. 575 Believ-
ers in corrective justice argue that the defendant has a moral responsi-
bility to pay for all the damage caused. And economists contend that
defendants will make efficient expenditures on safety only if com-
pelled to pay the full cost.576 As Judge Posner wrote: "If [pain and
suffering] were not recoverable in damages, the cost of negligence
would be less to the tortfeasor and there would be more negligence,
more accidents, more pain and suffering, and hence higher social
costs.
' ' 5 7 7
IX. CONCLUSION
I find those arguments unpersuasive. 578 The fact that the state can-
not entirely prevent the market from offering people ever greater op-
portunities to commodify themselves (and arguably should not try)
does not mean the state should lend its imprimatur and power to mak-
ing an involuntary transaction (a tortious injury) an occasion for fur-
ther commodification. As we learn more about how pain affects the
body, those who suffer should receive medical, psychotherapeutic, and
other rehabilitative care (paid by tortfeasors)-but not money. None
of the mechanisms for calculating generals solves the problem of arbi-
trariness. That eliminating generals would do relatively little to in-
crease equality is not an egalitarian argument against state complicity
574. 2 AMERICAN LAW INST. REPORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PER-
SONAL INJURY 215 (1991); DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 399 (2d ed. 1993).
575. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin offer empirical data in support. See Stephen Daniels
& Joanne Martin, The Texas Two-Step: Evidence on the Link Between Damage Caps and Access
to the Civil Justice System, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 635 (2006).
576. Jamie Court, When the Incentive to Save a Life Dies, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2004, at M5
(noting that California's cap "makes it cheaper to let children die from malpractice in California
hospitals than to save them").
577. Kwasny v. United States, 823 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1987). Robert Cooter argues that be-
cause people are willing to pay to avoid risk (e.g., the death of a child), even when they do not
necessarily want to be paid when the risk transpires because of the incommensurability of money
with those consequences (bereavement), such damages should be factored into "L" in the Hand
formula. Cooter, supra note 312, at 1098-99. Using the example of ruined irreplaceable wed-
ding pictures, Richard Craswell argues that "whenever nonpecuniary losses are involved ...
damages should be less than fully compensatory, insofar as we are concerned with providing
efficient levels of insurance." Richard Craswell, Instrumental Theories of Compensation, 40 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1135, 1153 (2003).
578. For another advocate of abolishing general damages, see Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and
Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163 (2004).
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in reproducing inequality. 579 The onus is on defenders to offer con-
vincing evidence that the disadvantaged gain more from general dam-
ages than they lose from the reproduction of inequality through the
proportioning of generals to specials and jury biases in awarding
generals. (At the least, I can turn their argument back on defenders:
generals are at least as inefficient and haphazard a redistribution
mechanism as the denial of generals. And I favor equalizing special
damages as well, by setting income replacement at some minimum
level-perhaps the median-thereby making those who wish to pro-
tect higher income streams pay the costs of doing so through loss in-
surance premiums.) 580 If people really value general damages enough
that they want to insure them, the state should correct the market
imperfections that prevent this and, as a last resort, sell such loss in-
surance itself.
The use of general damages to pay contingent fees undermines
other more fundamental rationales for general damages: the purchase
of pleasure equivalent to the pain suffered, and public recognition of
the loss (which cannot be important if the money goes to the lawyer).
The obscene fees pocketed by the most successful plaintiffs' personal
injury lawyers, who virtually monopolize the cases with the highest
general damages, are not necessary to ensure adequate legal represen-
tation. First, lawyers themselves have worked long and hard to make
sure that the market for legal services is seriously imperfect: entry bar-
riers are high (especially to the provision of services by nonlawyers),
and restrictive practices dampen intraprofessional competition. Brit-
ain allows nonlawyer claims agents to market their services freely to
the injured and negotiate settlements with tortfeasors and their insur-
ers.581 Second, there are many other possible fee arrangements: fee-
shifting (perhaps not perfectly symmetrical), legal insurance (ex ante
and ex post, perhaps with premiums recoverable from the defendant),
579. For arguments that tort law should pursue egalitarian goals, see Tsachi Keren-Paz, An
Inquiry into the Merits of Redistribution through Tort Law: Rejecting the Claim of Randomness,
16 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 91 (2003); Tsachi Keren-Paz, "It Costs Me More": Rejecting the
Arguments of Illegitimacy and Excessive Cost Brought against the Promotion of Equality in Pri-
vate Law, 7 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 541 (2004).
580. Interestingly, the one change Kenneth Feinberg would make on the basis of his experi-
ence administering the 9/11 fund is that "if Congress decides to provide compensation in the
event of a new terrorist attack, all eligible claimants should receive the same amount." See
FEINBERG, supra note 473, at 183.
Equality also responds to the criticism that eliminating generals will either distort the mix of
cases brought in favor of those with high specials or divert the energy of lawyers and experts to
inflating specials. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice
Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391 (2005).
581. RICHARD L. ABEL, ENGLISH LAWYERS BETWEEN MARKET AND STATE: THE POLITICS OF
PROFESSIONALISM 230-33 (2003).
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and state subsidy (on the theory that the deterrent effect of damages
creates a public good). 582 (English legal aid covered tort claims until
the misnamed Access to Justice Act 1999.)583 I remain unconvinced
that corrective justice theories are relevant to tort because: liability is
proportioned to consequences rather than conduct; consequences are
significantly affected by chance (negligence or worse causing no dam-
age, slight negligence causing immense harm); virtually all cases are
settled for significantly less than the actual injury; awards are almost
always paid by insurers or anonymous corporations, not individual
tortfeasors; and the process is almost entirely opaque to victims, who
see only a check, and even more to the public (especially since defend-
ants often insist on a confidentiality clause). Taking corrective justice
seriously would mean identifying real tortfeasors, who would ac-
knowledge responsibility, personally suffer consequences, apologize
to the victim, proclaim their misconduct to the public, and perhaps
even play a role in caregiving. 584 The most compelling argument for
general damages is deterrence. But we know almost nothing about
how effective tort law is as a deterrent, or the incremental safety gain
produced by including general damages.5 85
Tort liability's greatest strength is its combination of: (1) individual
initiative motivated by the self-interest of plaintiffs and their law-
yers-a powerful antidote to bureaucratic sloth and indifference, and
(2) the immunity of juries (which are both lay and ad hoc) to the cap-
ture that threatens all governmental regulation. But general damages
are unconnected to either trait. Eliminating them has many potential
advantages. Courts and legislatures might be more willing to extend
liability beyond the present arbitrary limitations framed in terms of
duty and proximate cause if they felt damages responded to necessi-
ties and did not overcompensate. The significant savings-the insur-
ance or corporate reserves to pay general damages and the
administrative costs of calculating them individually-would be freed
582. See Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants' Payment for Pain and Suffering
in Return for Payment of Claimants' Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 333; Stephen D.
Sugarman, The Legal Sting of Pain and Suffering, L.A. TIMES, June 5, 2005, at M5.
583. The Access to Justice Act 1999, 5 USC § 504.
584. A psychological experiment found that respondents awarded more compensation when
the defendant actually paid the victim. Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Intuitions About Penalties
and Compensation in the Context of Tort Law, 7 J. RIsK & UNCERTAINTY 17, 25 (1993).
585. Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994). Margo Schlanger persuasively suggests the perverse in-
centives that tort law creates for actions that reduce liability without increasing safety. Margo
Schlanger, Second Best Damage Action Deterrence, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 517 (2006). Gregory
Keating argued for a level of safety above that justified by cost-benefit analysis. Gregory C.
Keating, Pricelessness and Life: An Essay for Guido Calabresi 64 MD. L. REV. 159 (2005).
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to fund more effective regulation (although I am skeptical this could
be protected politically from diversion) 586 and to compensate all tort
victims, regardless of fault.587 Alternatively, fixed amounts could be
assessed for general damages (like the 9/11 fund), thereby eliminating
the need for individual adjudication, although aggravating arbitrari-
ness. Over sufficiently large populations of injuries these could ap-
proximate the actual harm inflicted (and thus let liability send a more
accurate signal of the costs of accidents). Plaintiffs would receive a
small proportion in recognition of their injury (and to motivate vic-
tims and lawyers to claim), while the rest would be earmarked for
regulation. (Posner has argued that compensatory damages "are paid
over to the plaintiff (to be divided with his lawyer) as the price of
enlisting their participation in the operation of the system," whose
"dominant function ... is to ... bring about ... the efficient ... level
of accidents and safety. ' 588 Many jurisdictions already direct a pro-
portion of punitive damages toward public goods.589) No other legal
system "needs" American-style general damages. 590 Like many fea-
tures of our law (as Holmes declared), general damages are the prod-
uct of experience, not logic. 591 Maybe it is time to jettison this bit of
American exceptionalism.
586. Of the $40.7 billion states have received from settling with the tobacco companies, only
five percent has been spent on reducing smoking. Illinois spent $315 million on tax relief, Michi-
gan spent seventy-five percent on college scholarships, and North Dakota spent forty-five per-
cent on water resources and flood control. Howard Markel, Burning Money, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
22, 2005, at A17.
587. A journalist claimed that nonpecuniary damages accounted for ninety percent of Illinois
medical malpractice jury awards. See Steve Stanek, Doctors Flee Illinois, HEALTH CARE NEWS,
Apr. 1, 2004. Skeptical, Neil Vidmar made his own tabulation of all thirty plaintiff verdicts from
Cook and DuPage counties in 2001 and suggested the figure was close to two-thirds. NEIL VID-
MAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE TORT SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS: A REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS
STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 66 tbl.5.1 (2005). But it is indisputable that general damages contrib-
ute greatly to delay and transaction costs. HUNTING & NEUWIRTH, supra note 37, at 117-20.
588. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972).
589. Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347 (2003).
590. DAMAGES FOR NON-PECUNIARY Loss IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (W.V. Horton
Rogers ed., 2001); BASIL MARKESINIS ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN EN-
GLISH, GERMAN AND ITALIAN LAW (2005); Gary Schwartz, Product Liability and Medical Mal-
practice in Comparative Context, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON
SAFETY AND INNOVCATION 73 (Peter Huber & Robert Litan eds, 1991); Anthony J. Sebok,
Translating the Immeasurable: Thinking About Pain and Suffering Comparatively, 55 DEPAUL L.
REV. 379 (2006); Stephen D. Sugarman, A Comparative Law Look at Pain and Suffering Awards,
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 399 (2006).
591. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Dover Publ. 1991) (1881).
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